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Abstract. It is well known that the classical three- and four-round Feistel constructions are provably
secure under chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks, respectively. However, irrespective of the
number of rounds, no Feistel construction can resist related-key attacks where the keys can be offset by a
constant. In this paper we show that, under suitable reuse of round keys, security under related-key attacks
can be provably attained. Our modification is substantially simpler and more efficient than alternatives
obtained using generic transforms, namely the PRG transform of Bellare and Cash (CRYPTO 2010) and
its random-oracle analogue outlined by Lucks (FSE 2004). Additionally we formalize Luck’s transform and
show that it does not always work if related keys are derived in an oracle-dependent way, and then prove
it sound under appropriate restrictions.
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic algorithms deployed in the real world are subject to a multitude of threats. Many of
these threats are accounted for in the theoretical security analysis carried out by cryptographers, but
not all. Indeed, many documented cases [31,14,13,39] show that theoretically secure cryptographic
algorithms can be vulnerable to relatively simple physical attacks, when these exploit implementation
aspects that were abstracted away in the security analysis. For this reason, an enormous research
effort has been undertaken in recent years to bridge the gap between physical security and theoretical
security.
An important part of this effort has been dedicated to related-key attacks (RKAs), which were first
identified by Knudsen and Biham [26,8] as an important risk on implementations of symmetric-key
cryptosystems. The idea behind these attacks is as follows. The security of cryptographic algorithms
depends fundamentally on keeping secret keys hidden from attackers for extended periods of time. For
this reason, secret keys are typically stored and manipulated in protected memory areas and dedicated
hardware components. When these mechanisms can be influenced by intrusive techniques (such as
fault injection [2]) an adversary may be able to disturb the value of a secret key and observe results
computed using the manipulated (and likely correlated) key value.
Since the original work of Knudsen and Biham, there have been many reported cases of successful
related-key cryptanalysis [9,27,7], and notably of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [10,11].
These results led to the consensual view that RKA resilience should be a standard design goal for low-
level cryptographic primitives such as block ciphers and hash functions. For example, in the recent SHA-
3 competition, candidates were analyzed with respect to such attacks (cf. the work of Khovratovich et
al. [25]), which played an important role in the selection process.
The importance of including RKA security as a design goal for basic cryptographic components
is further heightened by the fact that such low-level primitives are often assumed to provide RKA
security when used in higher-level protocols. Prominent examples are the key derivation procedures
in standard protocols such as EMV [15] and the 3GPP integrity and confidentiality algorithms [24],
where efficiency considerations lead to the use of the same block cipher under closely related keys.
Similar assumptions arise in constructions of tweakable ciphers [28], where a block cipher is called on
keys which are offset by xor-ing tweak values.
Provable RKA security. Bellare and Kohno [5] initiated the theoretical treatment of security
under related-key attacks by proposing definitions for RKA-secure pseudorandom functions (PRFs)
and pseudorandom permutations (PRPs), and presenting possibility and impossibility results for these
primitives. The models proposed in [5] were subsequently extended by Albrecht et al. [1] to address
the possibility of oracle-dependent attacks in idealized models of computation.
Various important positive results for provably RKA-secure constructions of complex cryptographic
primitives were subsequently published in the literature. Bellare and Cash [3] obtained a breakthrough
result by presenting a concrete construction of an RKA-secure pseudorandom function based on stan-
dard computational assumptions and in the standard model. Bellare, Cash, and Miller [4] present a
comprehensive treatment of RKA security for various cryptographic primitives, focusing on the prob-
lem of leveraging the RKA resilience of one primitive to construct RKA-secure instances of another.
In particular, Bellare et al. present a generic transformation in which an RKA-secure pseudorandom
generator can be used to convert instances of standard primitives such as digital signatures and identity-
based encryption into RKA-secure ones. Concrete constructions of RKA-secure public-key primitives
were given by Wee [42] and Bellare et al. [6].
Feistel networks. A Feistel network [16,17] is a construction that permits obtaining an efficiently
computable and invertible permutation from an efficiently computable function. The network is a
cascade of simple Feistel permutations, each relying on a round function (f , g, and h) mapping bit
strings of length n to outputs of the same length. Here the input and output are shown as tuples (L,R)
and (L′, R′), where each component is a string of length n. For any number of rounds, these networks
provide an invertible permutation over bit strings of length 2n. Figure 1 shows an example of a Feistel
network with three rounds.
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Fig. 1: A three-round Feistel network.
Feistel networks (and generalized variants such as those discussed by Hoang and Rogaway [22])
have been extensively used in the construction of symmetric cryptosystems (and even asymmetric ones
such as RSA-OAEP), since the notable case of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) in the 1970s [17].
In particular, a multitude of block ciphers include Feistel-like constructions in their design, including
GOST, MYSTY1, Skipjack, BEAR and LION, CAST-256, RC6, and MARS [38]. For this reason, the
security properties of Feistel networks received significant attention in the last decades.
Security of the Feistel construction. In their seminal paper, Luby and Rackoff [29] showed
that instantiating the round functions in a Feistel construction with independently keyed secure PRFs is
sufficient to obtain a secure PRP. For three rounds of cascading, this result applies when the adversary
has access to results of forward computations (i.e., under chosen-plaintext attacks), and for four rounds,
the result holds even if the adversary can additionally observe the results of inverse computations (i.e.,
under chosen-ciphertext attacks).
Following Luby and Rackoff’s result, many subsequent works looked at the security of Feistel
networks and generalized variants thereof. Important results were obtained with respect to the efficiency
of the construction, for example by reducing the necessary key material (cf. the work of Patarin [36])
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and by weakening the security assumptions for some of the round functions as in the work of Naor
and Reingold [35]. In a different direction, the security offered by Feistel networks with increasing
numbers of rounds was precisely characterized in a sequence of works by Vaudenay [41], Maurer and
Pietrzak [32], Patarin [37], and Hoang and Rogaway [22]. Holenstein, Künzler, and Tessaro [23] used
the Feistel construction with fourteen rounds to establish the equivalence of the random-oracle and
the ideal-cipher models in a broad range of applications via the indifferentiability framework [33].
RKA security of Feistel networks. Despite this large body of work on the provable security
of the Feistel construction and the positive results on the RKA security of advanced cryptographic
primitives referred above, the RKA security of the Feistel construction has received little attention.
Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, only the work of Bellare and Kohno [5] touches upon this topic,
where a strong negative result is shown: the Feistel construction irrespective of the number of rounds
is vulnerable to related-key attacks, provided that the attacker is able to modify as little as a single
bit in the key used in the last round function.
Referring to Figure 1, the attacker would proceed as follows. It would first observe the output
(L′1, R′1) of the permutation computed on an input (L,R). Then, the adversary would modify round
function h to some other function h′ by manipulating its key, and observe the output (L′2, R′2) computed
over the same input. The adversary can now determine whether or not it is interacting with the ideal
permutation: If interacting with Feistel, the outputs will always satisfy L′1 = L′2, whereas in for the
ideal (keyed) permutation the two outputs will be different with overwhelming probability. This attack
is possible whenever the adversary is able to independently tweak the round function of the output
stage in the network, independently of the number of rounds, and even if the round functions are
instantiated with RKA-secure PRFs.
This vulnerability is relevant for practical applications of Feistel constructions, since many im-
portant cryptanalytic results such as those presented by Biryukov et al. [10,11] can be described as
utilizing related keys that are derived by xor-ing the original key with a constant. This in particular
permits an attacker to selectively modify the secret key for the output round in a Feistel network and
break the security of the construction. In this work we initiate the treatment of provable RKA security
of the Feistel constructions. Our main result is that specific instances of Feistel networks that reuse
round keys offer intrinsic RKA security against practically relevant classes of RKD functions, and thus
overcome the negative result by Bellare and Kohno described above. We now present our contributions
in more detail.
Contributions. Lucks [30] proposes a general solution to the RKA security of any cryptographic
primitive in the random-oracle model: hash the secret key before applying it to the cryptosystem. The
intuition is that, modeling the hash function as a random oracle, any modification to the secret key
will result in a new independent key being used in the cryptosystem, confining the RKA adversary
to standard attacks. The RKA-secure PRG transform of Bellare, Cash, and Miller (BCM) [4] that
we discussed above can be seen as a special standard-model analogue of this transform. Somewhat
surprisingly, we show that the original random oracle transform does not always result in an RKA-
secure construction. We amend this by first showing that, under certain restrictions on the RKD set,
the random oracle is an RKA-secure PRG, and then extending the BCM result to the random-oracle
model. The set of necessary restrictions is permissive enough to include offsetting keys by constants
(even if those keys were hashed) as a particular case. This solution, however, in addition to relying on
strong assumptions on the hash function, gives rise to decreased efficiency with respect to the original
primitive.
Moreover, the above result only applies to a transformed construction and says nothing about
the RKA security of Feistel constructions (which could be present in the construction of the hash
function itself!). We therefore revisit the Bellare–Kohno (BK) negative result and complement it by
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characterizing the class of related-key attacks that can be sustained by three and four rounds Feistel
networks with independent round keys (i.e., the original Luby–Rackoff constructions). The class of
tolerated attacks is highly restrictive and, in particular, it excludes the xor-with-constants set. (This
was to be expected, since the BK attack can be launched using these RKD functions.)
We next consider variants of Feistel constructions in which the keys to round functions in different
stages of the network may be reused. These variants were already proposed in the literature (cf. the
work by Patarin [36]) due to the efficiency and security benefits of reducing the necessary secret key
material. However, we observe that key reuse has the added effect of limiting the power of an RKA
adversary in targeting individual round keys. We build on this intuition to obtain our main results:
we show that Feistel networks with three (resp., four) rounds can be proven CPA (resp., CCA) RKA
secure by relying on an RKA-secure PRF and using specific key assignments that reuse some of the
round keys.
Intuitively, our selection of key reusing assignments can be described as follows. It is well known
that reusing the same key in all rounds of the Feistel network or, more generally any palindromic
assignment of the keys, leads to totally insecure constructions. Additionally, the BK attack rules out
key assignments where the key to the output round (in both forward and inverse computations) can
be independently thwarted. These restrictions leave few plausible key assignments for intrinsic RKA
security of three- and four-round Feistel networks. From these candidates we selected two specific
assignments based on two PRF keys K1 and K2: we consider the key assignment (K1,K2,K2) for the
three-round variant, and the (K1,K2,K1,K2) key assignment for the four-round variant. We prove
that the three-round variant is CPA secure and that the four-round variant is CCA secure, both in
the RKA setting, assuming that the underlying PRF is RKA secure, and that the RKD set satisfies
natural restrictions akin to those adopted, e.g., in [5].
Our results require no other modification to the original constructions in addition to the key
assignment, and therefore come with minimal modifications to deployed implementations.3 We are able
to prove the RKA security of the three-stage (CPA) and four-stage (CCA) Luby–Rackoff constructions,
whilst reducing the amount of key material and potentially improving the efficiency of the resulting
implementations.
For practical applications, the most important aspect of our results is perhaps that they cover the
standard classes of RKD functions considered in literature, namely those which offset the key by xor-
ing a constant. However, for the sake of generality our presentation relies on a slightly more abstract
framework, where we characterize the covered classes of covered RKD functions by defining a set of
sufficient restrictions that they must satisfy. This approach also enables a clearer and more modular
presentation. For example, as an intermediate step, we formalize a notion of multi-key RKA security
that may be of independent interest, and relate it to the standard single-key variant.
From a foundational perspective, our result can be seen as one bringing RKA security analysis to
the classical constructions of pseudorandom objects. Goldberg and Liskov [18] study this question for
building RKA-secure pseudorandom generators (where the seed is interpreted as the key) from one-
way functions via Goldreich–Levin [19]. However, the natural questions of transforming RKA-secure
PRGs to RKA-secure PRFs via the GGM construction [20] or RKA-secure PRFs to PRPs via the
Luby–Rackoff constructions [29] have not been addressed yet. Our results can been seen as giving a
positive answer to the latter question for the xor set.
3 Albeit imposing a stronger security assumption on the underlying PRF.
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2 Preliminaries
Notation. We write x ← y for the action of assigning the value y to the variable x. We write
x1, . . . , xn←$ X for sampling x1, . . . , xn from a finite set X uniformly at random. If A is a probabilistic
algorithm we write y1, . . . , yn←$ A(x1, . . . , xn) for the action of running A on inputs x1, . . . , xn with
independently chosen coins, and assigning the result to y1, . . . , yn. For a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn), we
define x|i = xi. We let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. A function (λ) is negligible if |(λ)| ∈ λ−ω(1). ppt as usual
abbreviates probabilistic polynomial-time.
Keyed functions and permutations. Let Domλ, Rngλ, and KSpλ be three families of finite sets
parametrized by a security parameter λ ∈ N. We denote the set of all functions ρ : Domλ −→ Rngλ
by Func(Domλ,Rngλ). A keyed function is a set of functions in Func(Domλ,Rngλ) indexed by the
elements of the key space KSpλ. We denote the set of all keyed functions by Func(KSpλ,Domλ,Rngλ).
By the ideal keyed function, we mean the family of distributions corresponding to choosing a function
uniformly at random from Func(KSpλ,Domλ,Rngλ). The random oracle is the ideal keyed function
where KSpλ for each λ ∈ N contains a single key. We denote the set of all permutations on Domλ
by Perm(Domλ). Note that each permutation uniquely defines its inverse permutation (which is also
a member of this set). We define a family of keyed permutations analogously by indexing a set of
permutations according to keys in some space KSpλ. We denote the set of all such keyed permutations
by Perm(KSpλ,Domλ). The ideal keyed permutation (aka the ideal cipher) is defined as the family of
distributions that choose a random element of Perm(KSpλ,Domλ).
Pseudorandom function and permutation family. A pseudorandom function family PRF :=
{PRFλ}λ∈N is a family of efficiently implementable keyed functions, i.e., functions PRFλ : KSpλ ×
Domλ −→ Domλ, where PRPλ can be computed in polynomial time in λ, together with an efficient
procedure for sampling of keys and domain points which by a slight abuse of notation we denote by
KSp(1λ) and Dom(1λ), respectively. A pseudorandom permutation family is defined analogously with
the extra requirement that the inverse of each permutation in the family is also efficiently computable.
3 RKA-Secure Pseudorandom Functions and Permutations
In this section we introduce the formal framework in which we will analyze the RKA security of Feistel
constructions. We begin by formalizing the notion of a family of related-key deriving (RKD) functions,
which will parametrize our RKA security notions. Subsequently we introduce a generalization of the
standard security model for RKA-secure pseudorandom functions and permutations to a scenario where
multiple secret keys may be present in the system and influence the secret key derived by an RKD
function. This is the natural setting for analyzing Feistel networks, as they use multiple instances of
the same PRF.
Family of RKD sets. A family of n-ary related-key deriving (RKD) sets Φ is a family of RKD sets
{Φλ} consisting of RKD functions φ (viewed as circuits) which map an n-tuple of keys in some key
space KSpλ to a new key in KSpλ, i.e., φ : KSp
n
λ → KSpλ. Throughout the paper we assume that
membership in any RKD set can be efficiently decided.
Multi-key RKA security. Let PRP := {PRPλ : KSpλ × Domλ −→ Domλ} be a pseudorandom
permutation family and let Φ := {Φλ} be a family of n-ary RKD sets where the implicit key space of
the RKD functions in Φλ is KSpλ. Let game RKCCAPRP,A,Φ(1λ) be as shown in Figure 2. We say that
PRP is Φ-RKCCA secure if the advantage of any legitimate ppt adversary A defined as
AdvrkccaPRP,A,Φ(λ) := 2 · Pr
[
RKCCAPRP,A,Φ(1λ)
]
− 1
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is negligible as a function of λ. An adversary is legitimate if it queries the RKFn and RKFn−1 oracles
with functions φ in Φλ only.4 We say PRP is Φ-RKCPA secure if the above advantage is negligible for
any legitimate ppt adversary A that never queries its RKFn−1 oracle.
RKCCAPRP,A,Φ(1λ):
b←$ {0, 1}
pi←$ Perm(KSpλ,Domλ)
K1, . . . ,Kn←$ KSp(1λ)
b′←$ ARKFn,RKFn−1(1λ)
Return (b′ = b)
RKFn(φ, x):
K′ ← φ(K1, . . . ,Kn)
If b = 0 Return pi(K′, x)
Return PRP(K′x)
RKFn−1(φ, x):
K′ ← φ(K1, . . . ,Kn)
If b = 0 Return pi−1(K′, x)
Return PRP−1(K′, x)
Fig. 2: Game defining the Φ-RKCCA security of a PRP.
In Appendix A we prove that under the natural (but strong) restriction that any φ ∈ Φλ is of the
form φ : (K1, . . . ,Kn) 7→ ψ(Ki), where i ∈ [n] and ψ : KSpλ −→ KSpλ is a unary RKD function, the
single-key and multi-key RKA models are equivalent.
Remark. The multi-key RKA model for PRFs (under chosen-plaintext attacks) is recovered when pi
is sampled from Func(KSpλ,Domλ,Rngλ) and oracle RKFn
−1 is no longer present. When n = 1, we
recover the single-key RKA model for PRPs and PRFs as in [5]. The standard model for PRPs/PRFs
is one where the RKD sets Φλ contain the identity functions idλ : KSpλ −→ KSpλ; K 7→ K only.
The above definition is not the strongest multi-key security model that one can envision. (For instance
consider a model where the adversary can choose the arity n.) However, since the applications that
we consider in this paper have a fixed number of keys, the simpler definition above is sufficient for our
purposes.
4 The Random-Oracle Transform
One way to transform a standard pseudorandom permutation to one which resists related-key attacks
is to hash the PRP key before using it in the construction [30]. We call this the “Hash-then-PRP”
transform. Bellare and Cash [3, Theorem 6.1] prove the soundness of this approach in the standard
model for a restricted class of RKD functions, when the hash function is replaced by an RKA-secure
pseudorandom generator. At first sight it appears that the ideal hash function (i.e., the random oracle)
should be a valid instantiation of this construction. However, in the random-oracle model (ROM) the
security proof should be carried out in a setting where all parties have access to the random oracle
(which models the hash function). In this section we consider the implications of this observation, and
show that the random oracle does not always give rise to a good instantiation of the construction. We
also provide a set of sufficient conditions that allows us to formally prove that the heuristic transform
is sound in the ROM.
RKA-secure PRG in ROM.5 We define an oracle RKD function to be a circuit which contains
special oracle gates, and we write an n-ary oracle RKD function as φH : KSpn → KSp. Families of
oracle RKD sets are defined in the obvious way.
4 Throughout the paper, we assume all the adversaries are, in this sense, legitimate.
5 We remark that this game can also be seen as extension of correlated-input secure hashing [21] to the random-oracle
model.
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RKAPRG,A,Φ(1λ):
ρ←$ Func(Dom,Rng)
H←$ Func(Dom′,Rng′)
K1, . . . ,Kn←$ Dom(1λ)
b←$ {0, 1}
b′←$ ARKFn,RO(1λ)
Return (b′ = b)
RKFn(φ):
K′ ← φH(K1, . . . ,Kn)
If b = 0 Return ρ(K′)
Return PRGH(K′)
RO(X):
Return H(X)
Fig. 3: Game defining the Φ-RKA security of a PRG. An adversary is legitimate if it queries RKFn with a φ ∈ Φλ only.
Let PRGH : Dom −→ Rng be a pseudorandom generator in the ROM. Let game RKAPRG,A,Φ be
as shown in Figure 3. We say that PRG is Φ-RKA secure if the advantage of any ppt adversary A as
defined below is negligible in λ.
AdvrkaPRG,Φ,A(λ) := 2 · Pr
[
RKAPRF,A,Φ(1λ)
]
− 1 .
The question that we wish to answer is under which conditions does the random oracle itself (i.e.,
when PRGH(X) := H(X)) constitute an RKA-secure PRG. The attack we now show and the ensuing
discussion demonstrate that this is only the case if we exclude certain forms of oracle-dependent related-
key attacks.
The attack. Consider a unary RKD set containing the identity function and an oracle-dependent
RKD function [1] φH given by Φ := {id : K 7→ K, φH : K 7→ H(K)}. Here, H denotes the random
oracle. Now consider an adversary that first requests a PRG value of the seed by querying id to the
RKFn oracle. It receives as response a value y which is either H(K), when b = 1, or ρ(K) when b = 0,
where ρ is an independent random oracle. The adversary now queries y to RO to get a new value
z which is either H(H(K)) or H(ρ(K)). Finally, the adversary queries φH to RKFn to get a value
z′ which is either H(H(K)) or ρ(H(K)). Now, when b = 1, then z = z′ with probability 1. When
b = 0 the values z and z′ would only match if H(ρ(K)) = ρ(H(K)). The probability of this event is
negligible, and thus the adversary wins with overwhelming probability by returning (z = z′).
We now define a sufficient set of restrictions on oracle RKD sets that allow us to prove a ROM
analogue of the result by Bellare and Cash [3]. Intuitively the restrictions are strong enough to rule
out attacks that follow the above pattern.
Output unpredictability. A family of oracle RKD sets Φ is output unpredictable (UP) if the
following definition of advantage is negligible in λ for any ppt adversary A outputting a list of RKD
functions and a list of keys.
AdvupA,Φ(λ) := Pr [∃ (φH ,K∗) ∈ L1 × L2 s.t. φH(K) = K∗ :
H←$ Func(KSpλ,KSpλ);K←$ KSpnλ; (L1, L2)←$ AH(1λ)
]
Claw-freeness. A family of oracle RKD sets Φ is claw-free (CF) if the following definition of advan-
tage is negligible in λ for any ppt adversary A outputting a list of RKD functions.
AdvcfA,Φ(λ) := Pr [∃ φH1 , φH2 ∈ L s.t. φH1 (K) = φH2 (K) ∧ φH1 6= φH2 :
H←$ Func(KSpλ,KSpλ);K←$ KSpnλ; L←$ AH(1λ)
]
Query independence. A family of oracle RKD sets Φ is query independent (QI) if the following
definition of advantage is negligible in λ for any ppt adversary A outputting a list of RKD functions.
AdvqiA,Φ(λ) := Pr [∃ φH1 , φH2 ∈ L s.t. φH1 (K) ∈ Qry[φH2 (K)] :
H←$ Func(KSpλ,KSpλ);K←$ KSpnλ; L←$ AH(1λ)
]
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Here, Qry[φH2 (K)] denotes the set of queries placed to H by φH2 when run on a vector of keys K. Note
that RKD functions φH1 and φH2 need not be distinct.
We recover the standard (non-oracle) definition of output unpredictability and claw-freeness [5],
when the RKD functions do not make any oracle queries: the random oracle can be simulated using
lazy sampling. Query independence is trivially satisfied for such non-oracle RKD functions.
We now prove that the random oracle is an RKA-secure pseudorandom generator under the above
restrictions on the oracle RKD set, and then build on this result to establish security of the Hash-
then-PRP transform in the random-oracle model. Looking ahead, this result allows us to take a Luby–
Rackoff PRP and generically transform it to obtain an RKA-secure PRP. In subsequent sections we
will explore less intrusive, more efficient alternatives that take advantage of the inner structure of the
Feistel construction.
Theorem 1 (RKA security of the random oracle). Let Φ be a family of oracle RKD sets. Then
for any Φ-RKCCA adversary A against the pseudorandom generator PRGH(K) := H(K), there are
adversaries A1, A2, and A3 such that
AdvrkcpaPRG,A,Φ(λ) ≤ AdvupA1,Φ(λ) + 2 ·AdvcfA2,Φ(λ) +Adv
qi
A3,Φ(λ) .
Proof (Sketch). We give only the intuition; the details of the proof can be found in Appendix B.
Assume, without loss of generality, that the adversary never places repeat queries to its RKFn and
RO oracles. Let Game0 denote the RKA game where H is used in the RKFn oracle (i.e., the challenge
bit is 1).
We modify Game0 to Game1 by implementing the H oracle in the RKFn oracle in a forgetful
way (i.e., we won’t keep track of repetitions), but leaving it unchanged for the explicit queries made
through RO and the indirect queries placed by the oracle RKD functions. Note that in this game the
adversary receives independently and uniformly distributed strings from either of its oracles.
Games Game0 and Game1 are identical unless one of the following events takes place: 1) A repeat
H query is placed as a result of an explicit RO query and an output of an oracle RKD function queried
to RKFn: this leads to a violation of the output unpredictability. 2) There is a repeat query to H as a
result of two distinct RKFn queries: this leads to a claw-freeness break. 3) There is a repeat H query
as a result of a query to RKFn and an indirect query placed by an oracle RKD function to H: this
breaks the query-independence property.
We now modify Game1 to Game2 by changing the forgetful oracle and implementing it using an
independently chosen (non-forgetful) random oracle. The games are identical unless there is a claw
among the RKD functions queried to RKFn, which by the above analysis happens with negligible
probability. Finally note that Game2 is identical to the RKA game conditioned on b = 0.6 uunionsq
In Appendix C we state and prove a random-oracle model analogue of the RKA-secure PRG transform
of Bellare, Cash, and Miller [4], which in combination with Theorem 1 establishes security of the Hash-
then-PRP transform (in the random-oracle model).
5 The Feistel Construction
In this section we recall the formal definitions related to the Feistel constructions and introduce our
notion for key assignments. We also establish a general result that permits shifting the analysis of
6 This transition my be avoided by observing that Game0 and Game2 are also identical until the same bad events which
separate Game0 and Game1 take place.
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Feistel networks with any number of rounds where the round functions are instantiated with an RKA-
secure PRF to a more convenient setting where the round functions are instantiated with the ideal
keyed function.
Feistel networks. The one-round Feistel construction and its inverse with respect to a function f
is defined as
F[f ](L,R) := (R,L⊕ f(R)) and F−1[f ](L,R) := (R⊕ f(L), L) .
The n-round Feistel construction with respect to functions f1, . . . , fn is defined recursively via the
following equations (see Figure 1 for a pictorial representation).
F[f1, . . . , fn](L,R) := F[f2, . . . , fn](F[f1](L,R)) ,
F−1[f1, . . . , fn](L,R) := F−1[f1, . . . , fn−1](F−1[fn](L,R))
Typically, functions f1, . . . , fn are implemented using a PRF under independently generated keys
K1, . . . ,Kn. In our analysis we will also consider the conceptual setting in which these functions are
instantiated by the ideal keyed function ρ, again under independently generated keys K1, . . . ,Kn. We
denote these constructions by FPRF[K1, . . . ,Kn] and Fρ[K1, . . . ,Kn], respectively.
Key assignment. A key assignment is a family of circuits κλ : KSpλ −→ KSpnλ, where KSp is an
arbitrary key space. Given κ := {κλ} and K ∈ KSpλ, we consider the associated n-round Feistel
construction FPRF[κ(K)]. When the key K ∈ KSpλ is randomly generated, we denote the construct by
FPRF[κ]. For example, the Hash-then-PRP transform of the previous section can be viewed as FPRF[H].
We are, however, interested in simple key assignments of the form κ : (K1, . . . ,Km) 7→ (Ki1 , . . . ,Kin),
where i1, . . . , in are fixed indices in [m]. We will therefore compactly write the Feistel construction
associated to the simple key assignment above by FPRF[i1, . . . , in]. For example, when κ(K1,K2) :=
(K1,K2,K2), the associated Feistel construction is written as FPRF[1, 2, 2].
When the round functions in a 3-round Feistel construction are instantiated with a PRF under
independent keys, we obtain the classic CPA-secure Luby–Rackoff pseudorandom permutation. When
4 rounds are used, we obtain its CCA-secure counterpart. As stated in the introduction, Bellare and
Kohno [5] observed that if an adversary can arbitrarily tamper with the key used in the last round
of any Feistel network, then a successful related-key attack is possible (even if the underlying PRF is
RKA secure).
As discussed in the previous section, using Theorems 5 and 1 we can obtain a PRP which resists
related-key attacks by applying the transform to the Luby–Rackoff construction. The underlying PRG
can be instantiated in the standard model via an RKA-secure PRF (e.g., that used in the Luby–Rackoff
construction) as suggested in [3] or, stepping outside the standard model, using random oracles.
Both transformations, however, come with two major drawbacks. The first drawback is the perfor-
mance penalty. The standard-model approach incurs a total of six PRF computations in the 3-round
network: 3 calls to generate the keys and another 3 to compute the PRP.7 (The total number of calls
is eight for the CCA case.) Note that the amortized complexity of the construction cannot be brought
down back to 3 by storing the generated keys, as related-key attacks can be applied to these keys. In the
ROM transform (on top of strong assumptions) the penalty will be smaller if the hash function is more
efficient than the PRF. However, this leads to a second drawback: the transform is software/hardware
intrusive, as extra circuitry for the implementation key-derivation procedure need to be added.
For these reasons, in the remainder of the paper, we will consider more efficient alternatives to
obtaining RKA-secure PRPs by exploring directly the structure of Feistel constructions via simple key
7 The overall tightness of security obtained via [3, Theorem 6.1] is also worse than what we obtain here, although it is
possible that it can be improved via a direct analysis.
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assignments. Before doing so, we prove a general theorem that allows us to move from the security
analysis of a Feistel construction with respect to an RKA-secure PRF to a setting in which the round
functions are instantiated by the ideal keyed function. Our result holds for any number of rounds and
any key assignment.
Theorem 2 (Computational RKA transition). Let Φ be a family of RKD sets containing func-
tions of the form KSpm −→ KSpm and let κ : KSpm −→ KSpn be a key assignment. Define Ψ :=
∪i(κ ◦ Φ)i, where (κ ◦ Φ)i is the RKD set obtained by composing function in Φ by κ on the right and
then projecting to i-th component for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let ρ denote the ideal keyed function, and let PRF
denote be a pseudorandom function. Then for any ppt adversary A against the Φ-RKCCA security of
FPRF[κ], there is an adversary B against the Ψ-RKCPA security of PRF such that
AdvrkccaFPRF[κ],A,Φ(λ) ≤ AdvrkccaFρ[κ],A,Φ(λ) +AdvrkcpaPRF,B,Ψ(λ) .
An analogous result holds for Φ-RKCPA adversaries.
Proof (Sketch). We start with the Φ-RKCCA game for FPRF[κ] and replace all n rounds function in
the Feistel construction with the ideal keyed function. Any change in an adversary A’s advantage in
the two games can be used to break the (multi-key) Ψ-RKCCA security of PRF via an adversary B.
Algorithm B runs A and answers its forward queries to the Feistel construction as follows. On input
(φ, x) where φ ∈ Φ, algorithm B sets ψ1 := (κ ◦ φ)|1 and calls the RKFn oracle on (ψ1, x) to get x1.
It then sets ψ2 := (κ ◦ φ)|2, queries RKFn on (ψ2, x1) to get x2. Algorithm B continues in this way
for all n rounds and returns the final output. Backward queries can be also handled similarly using
RKFn in the reverse direction. Clearly, according to the challenge bit b used in the Ψ-RKCPA game,
B simulates the Φ-RKCCA game with the same challenge bit b for algorithm A. uunionsq
6 CPA Security: The 3-Round Constructions
As we discussed in the introduction, no palindromic assignment of keys in a three-round Feistel con-
struction can result in a CPA-secure PRP, since the construction in the forward direction can be used
to compute inverses, and a trivial distinguishing attack emerges. Moreover, if the key used in the
third round is independent of those used in first and second rounds, then the BK attack applies. Un-
der these restriction, for simple key assignments and up to relabeling of the indices, we are left with
only one 3-round construction which can potentially achieve CPA security under related-key attacks:
FPRF[1, 2, 2].
The main proof of this section is an information-theoretic argument showing that Fρ[1, 2, 2] is Φ-
RKCPA secure for Φ’s which are claw-free and switch-free. Combined with Theorem 2 in the previous
section, this implies that FPRF[1, 2, 2] offers intrinsic RKA resilience, in the sense that it permits
leveraging the RKA-security properties of its underlying PRF.
For the security proof in this and the next sections we need to rely on an additional restriction on
RKD sets.
Switch-freeness. A family of RKD sets Φ with arity n > 2 is called switch-free (SF) if the advantage
of any ppt adversary A as defined below is negligible as a function of λ.
AdvsfA,Φ(λ) := Pr [(∃φ1, φ2 ∈ L)(∃i 6= j ∈ [n]) φ1(K)|i = φ2(K)|j :
K←$ KSpnλ; L←$ A(1λ)
]
We note that the switch-free and claw-free properties are in general incomparable. Consider, for
example, the set consisting of id and a function which agrees with id on all but one point. This set
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is switch-free but not claw-free. Conversely, consider the set consisting of id and the map (K1,K2) 7→
(K2,K1). This set is claw-free but not switch-free.
Theorem 3 (Fρ[1, 2, 2] security). Let Φ be a family of RKD sets. Then the Fρ[1, 2, 2] construction
is Φ-RKCPA secure in the ideal keyed function model if Φ is claw-fee and switch-free. More precisely,
for every Φ-RKCPA adversary A placing at most Q(λ) queries to RKFn, there exist adversaries B1
and B2 such that
AdvrkcpaFρ[1,2,2],A,Φ(λ) ≤ Adv
rf/rp
A,Φ (λ) + 2 ·AdvsfB1,Φ(λ) + 4 ·AdvcfB2,Φ(λ) +
25 ·Q(λ)2
|Domλ| .
Proof (Intuition). We give a high-level description of the proof and refer the reader to Appendix E
for the full details. We assume, without loss of generality, that the adversary is non-repeating in the
sense that it not place redundant repeat queries to its oracle. We start with the Φ-RKCPA game,
and consider a modified game where the round functions are implemented as follows. The first round
is implemented using a consistent ideal keyed function (as in the original construction). The second
and third round functions, however, will be forgetful and return independent random values on each
invocation irrespective of the input values. Note that the outputs of the network computed according
to this game are random, and, by an appropriate strengthening of the classical PRP/PRF switching
lemma (Lemma 1 in Appendix D), they are also indistinguishable from the ideal keyed permutation.
Furthermore, in this game the values of the outputs of the first round function remain hidden as they
are masked by random values generated in the third round.
Now the game above differs from the original CPA game due to inconsistencies occurring in com-
puting round function values both across and within the same round, when the adversary is able to
cause collisions in round function inputs in the original CPA game that are ignored in the game above.
There are five such pairs of inconsistencies possible (we keep track of queries to the first round, so
inconsistencies wont happen there). If there is a collision in inputs, which include the keys, to the first
and second or first and third rounds, then the keys collide and this event leads to a violation of switch-
freeness. Now suppose the inconsistency is due to a collision between the inputs to the third round
function. Since the outputs of the second round function are randomly chosen at each invocation, this
event happens with probability roughly Q(λ)2/|Domλ| by the birthday bound. Collisions between the
inputs to the second and third rounds also happen with negligible probably as the outputs of the first
round remain hidden from the adversary. Finally, we are left with collisions in the inputs to the second
round function. Note that this means that the keys input to this function are identical. Now if the
keys or right halves of the inputs used in the first round in the two colliding queries were different,
then the outputs of the first round function would be random and independent, and a collision would
happen with a negligible probability (as first-round outputs are hidden). If the keys and right halves
were identical, a collision can only take place if the left halves are also identical. However, due to the
non-repeating condition, in this case we must have that the queried RKD functions are distinct, and
consequently a claw in the RKD set is discovered. uunionsq
We emphasize that we do not claim the switch-free and claw-free restrictions are necessary for non-
existence of attacks. On the other hand, these restrictions are akin to those adopted in previous works
on RKA security, and do not overly constrain the practical applicability of our results. For example,
the n-ary RKD sets for xor-ing with constants defined by
Φ⊕m,λ := {φC1,...,Cm : (K1, . . . ,Km) 7→ (K1 ⊕ C1, . . . ,Km ⊕ Cm) : (C1, . . . , Cm) ∈ KSpmλ }
can be easily shown to satisfy these restrictions. Unpredictability follows from the fact that each map
in the set induces a permutation over the keys (and hence output distribution is uniform). For claw-
freeness suppose we are given two distinct RKD functions. Suppose they differ in their i-th component,
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i.e., Ci 6= C ′i. Then, since the keys Ki and Kj are chosen independently and uniformly at random, the
probability that the i-th output keys match, i.e., that Ki⊕Ci = Kj ⊕C ′i, is negligible. Switch-freeness
follows from a similar argument. Note finally that the restrictions needed in Theorems 1 and 2 are
easily shown to be satisfied by the above set, as the key assignment is simple. We obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. FPRF[1, 2, 2] is a Φ⊕2 -RKCPA-secure PRP, if PRF is a Φ
⊕
1 -RKCPA-secure PRF.
In Appendix F we characterize the RKA security of the original three-round Luby–Rackoff con-
struction, where three independent round keys are used.
7 CCA Security: The 4-Round Constructions
It is well known that the Fρ[1, 2, 3] construction is CCA insecure. For example, the attacker can proceed
as follows: 1) Choose arbitrary L,R,L′, query RKFn(L,R) to obtain C1 and query RKFn(L′, R) to
obtain C2; 2) Query RKFn−1(C2 ⊕ (0, L ⊕ L′)) to obtain C3; 3) Check if (C1 ⊕ C2 ⊕ Swap(C3)) is
same as R. The same attack applies to all Feistel networks with three rounds, independently of the
key assignment, and so there is no hope that such constructions can achieve any form of CCA security.
In this section we investigate the CCA security of 4-round constructions under related-key attacks.
Due to the generic related-key attacks that we listed in the previous section (insecurity of palindromic
key assignment and tampering with the last key), and the fact the in the CCA model the construction
can be accessed in both the forward and backward directions, the only candidates than can poten-
tially satisfy RKCCA security are: Fρ[1, 1, 2, 1], its inverse Fρ[1, 2, 1, 1], Fρ[1, 1, 2, 2], Fρ[1, 2, 1, 2], and
Fρ[1, 2, 3, 1]. In this work, we look at Fρ[1, 2, 1, 2].
The proof of RKCCA security for the F[1, 2, 1, 2] construction, as in the RKCPA case, has two
components: a computational part allowing transition from PRFs to ideal keyed functions, and an
information-theoretic argument that establishes security when the construction is instantiated with
the ideal keyed function. The first part of the proof follows from Theorem 2. We now prove the second
part.
Theorem 4 (F[1, 2, 1, 2] security). Let Φ be a family of RKD sets. Suppose Φ is claw-fee and switch-
free. Then the Fρ[1, 2, 1, 2] construction is Φ-RKCCA secure in the ideal keyed function model. More
precisely, for every Φ-RKCCA adversary A placing at most Q(λ) queries to RKFn or RKFn−1, there
are B1 and B2 such that
AdvrkccaFρ[1,2,1,2],A,Φ(λ) ≤ Advrf/rpA,Φ (λ) + 2 ·AdvsfB1,Φ(λ) + 8 ·AdvcfB2,Φ(λ) +
28 ·Q(λ)2
|Domλ| .
Proof (Intuition). We give a high-level description of the proof and refer the reader to Appendix E for
the full details. The proof follows the same structure as Theorem 3, but it is slightly more complex
due to the possibility of collisions occurring in the inputs of the round functions when they are used
in the RKFn and RKFn−1 oracles. We assume, without loss of generality, that the adversary is non-
repeating in the sense that it does not place repeat queries to either of its oracles, does not decipher
an enciphered value, and does not enciphered a deciphered value.
We start with the Φ-RKCCA game where the round functions faithfully implement the ideal keyed
function. We then consider a game where all round functions are implemented in a forgetful way except
that 1) the input round function in RKFn is consistent and also keeps track of the entries contributed
from RKFn−1’s output round; and 2) the input round function in RKFn−1 is consistent and also keeps
track of the entries contributed from RKFn’s output round. In this game the output values of the
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construction are random and hence indistinguishable from those from the ideal keyed permutation by
Lemma 1. Furthermore, the outputs of the input round functions in the RKFn and RKFn−1 oracles
remain hidden as they are masked by the forgetful action of the remaining round functions.
As in the CPA setting, we need to keep track of collisions in the inputs to various pairs of round
functions with lead to inconsistencies, as follows. 1) First forward and fourth backward rounds are con-
sistent with previous queries due to their implementation. 2) Collisions between even and odd numbered
round functions in both directions happen with negligible probability due to switch-freeness. 3) Inputs
to the third and fourth forward rounds collide with negligible probability with the previous inputs of all
other round functions due to the randomness of their respective inputs. A similar argument applies to
the first and second backward rounds. 4) Collisions between first forward and third forward/backward
rounds happen with negligible probability as the outputs of the fourth backward round are random
and remain hidden from the adversary. A similar argument applies to the fourth/second rounds in the
backward direction. 5) Collisions between second forward and fourth forward/backward rounds happen
with negligible probability as outputs of the first forward round are random and remain hidden. A
similar argument applies to the second round in the backward direction. 6) Finally, collisions between
the second forward round and itself or second backward can be bounded using the fact that outputs of
the first forward round are random remain hidden, combined with claw-freeness, similarly to the CPA
case. A similar argument applies to the third backward round. uunionsq
As in the CPA setting, the Φ⊕4 family satisfies all the prerequisites of Theorems 1, 2, and 4, and we
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. FPRF[1, 2, 1, 2] is a Φ⊕2 -RKCCA-secure PRP, if PRF is a Φ
⊕
1 -RKCPA-secure PRF.
In Appendix H we give a positive result for the RKA security of the original 4-round Luby–Rackoff
construction.
8 Directions for Further Research
This works takes a first step in the construction of RKA-secure symmetric cryptosystems based on
Feistel networks, and leaves open a number of directions for future research. From a conceptual point
of view, the RKA-security of many-round Feistel networks (including beyond-birthday-type concrete
security) are important open questions. From a practical point of view, the RKA security of alternative
constructions of PRPs such as generalized Feistel networks [22] and key-alternating ciphers [12], along
with their potential (dis)advantages over Feistel networks are another interesting direction for future
work.
We conclude the paper with a conjecture about the RKA security of Feistel networks with respect to
arbitrary numbers of rounds and key assignments, which generalizes the CCA characterization studied
in [34], and generalizes our result in Section 7 to the other plausible key assignments.
Conjecture. Let n > 3 be an integer, κ : KSpm −→ KSpn be a simple key assignment, and Φ
be a family of RKD sets consisting of functions φ : KSpm −→ KSpm. Suppose that the following
requirements are satisfied.
1. κ ◦ Φ is output unpredictable and claw-free.
2. (κ,Φ) is palindrome-fee: for any φ, φ′ ∈ Φ the probability over a random (K1, . . . ,Km) that κ ◦
φ′(K1, . . . ,Km) = σ ◦ κ ◦ φ(K1, . . . ,Km) is negligible, where σ(K1, . . . ,Km) := (Km, . . . ,K1).
3. (κ,Φ) is first-key repeating: for any two distinct φ, φ′ ∈ Φ the probability over a random (K1, . . . ,Km)
that [κ◦φ(K1, . . . ,Km)]1 6= [κ◦φ′(K1, . . . ,Km)]1 and [κ◦φ(K1, . . . ,Km)]i = [κ◦φ′(K1, . . . ,Km)]i
for all 1 < i ≤ n is negligible.
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4. (κ,Φ) is last-key repeating: for any two distinct φ, φ′ ∈ Φ the probability over a random (K1, . . . ,Km)
that [κ◦φ(K1, . . . ,Km)]n 6= [κ◦φ′(K1, . . . ,Km)]n and [κ◦φ(K1, . . . ,Km)]i = [κ◦φ′(K1, . . . ,Km)]i
for all 1 ≤ i < n is negligible.
Then the Fρ[κ] construction is Φ-RKCCA secure in the ideal keyed function model and hence, combined
with Theorem 2, the FPRF[κ] construction is Φ-RKCCA secure for a Ψ-RKCPA-secure PRF, for Ψ as in
the statement of Theorem 2.
We note that among the above restrictions claw-freeness is the only requirement which is not
known to be necessary. Hence we obtain an “almost” characterization. Note, however, that the RKA
security of a deterministic cryptosystems seems difficult to be established without assuming claw-
freeness (nevertheless, cf. [4] for the weaker ICR notion). The conjecture strengthens and extends
some of the results presented in the previous sections.
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A Equivalence of Multi-Key and Single-Key RKA Security
The implication from multi-key security to single-key security follows from a simple direct reduction.
The reverse direction is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Multi-key to single-key reduction). Let PRPλ : KSpλ × Domλ −→ Domλ be a
pseudorandom permutation family, and let Φ be a family of n-ary RKD sets. Suppose that any φ ∈ Φλ
is of the form φ : (K1, . . . ,Kn) 7→ ψ(Ki), where i ∈ [n] and ψ : KSpλ −→ KSpλ is a unary RKD
function. We denote the unary function corresponding to φ by (i, ψ)[φ], and assume that a description
of it can be effectively computed given φ. Now let Ψi,λ :=
⋃
φ∈Φλ(i, ψ)[φ], and define Ψi := {Ψi,λ}.
Then for any multi-key Φ-RKCCA adversary A, there exist single-key adversaries B1, . . . ,Bn such that
AdvrkccaPRP,A,Φ(λ) ≤
n∑
i=1
AdvrkccaPRP,Bi,Ψi(λ) .
Furthermore, if A is a CPA adversary, then so are the adversaries Bi. An analogous result for the Φ-
RKCPA security of PRFs also holds.
Proof (Sketch). The proof proceeds via a standard hybrid argument as follows. Game0 is the multi-key
RKA game where the challenge bit is set to 1 (i.e., PRP is used in the two oracles). We modify this
game to Game1 and answer all RKA queries (which map to) (1, ψ) in either the forward or backward
direction using the ideal keyed permutation rather than the PRP. All other queries (i.e., those which
map to (i, ψ) for i > 1) are answered as in Game0 using the PRP. Using the single-key Ψ-RKCCA
security of the PRP it is easy to show that A’s advantage changes negligibly from Game0 to Game1 by
constructing Ψ-RKCCA adversary B1 that interpolates between the two games. We now continue in this
manner with a sequence of games for functions (2, ψ), . . . , (n, ψ) until we reach a terminal game Gamen
where all the queries (i, ψ) are answered using the ideal keyed permutation. This game is identical to
the Φ-RKCCA game where the challenge bit is set to 0. uunionsq
B The RKA Security of the Random Oracle
We refer the reader to Section 4 for an intuitive description of the proof.
Proof. The proof proceeds along four game hops as follows. In each game we let Si denote the event
that the adversary A returns 1 in Gamei.
Game0 : is the RKA security game conditioned on b = 1 (i.e., when the RKFn oracle uses the random
oracle H) and where the random oracle H is implemented via a lazy sampling procedure T .
Game1 : keeps track of the queries made to H as result of outputs of oracle RKD functions computed
in the RKFn oracle on a separate list T ′, and keeps full consistency between T and T ′. (Direct queries
to H coming from the adversary or the RKD functions are still handled through T .) This change is
purely conceptual change and the two games are identical:
Pr[S0] = Pr[S1] .
Game2 : sets flag bad if procedure T is queried on a point which exists on list T ′, or procedure T ′ is
queried on a point which exists on list T . No action is taken and the two games are identical.
Pr[S1] = Pr[S2] .
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Game1:
K←$ Dom(1λ)
b′←$ ARKFn,RO(1λ)
Return (b′ = 1)
RKFn(φ):
K′ ← φT (K)
Return T ′(K′)
RO(X):
Return T (X)
T (X):
If T [X] 6= ⊥ Return T [X]
If T ′[X] 6= ⊥ Return T ′[X]
T [X]←$ Rng
Return T [X]
T ′(X):
If T [X] 6= ⊥ Return T [X]
If T ′[X] 6= ⊥ Return T ′[X]
T ′[X]←$ Rng
Return T ′[X]
Game2 and Game3:
K←$ Dom(1λ)
b′←$ ARKFn,RO(1λ)
Return (b′ = 1)
RKFn(φ):
K′ ← φT (K)
Return T ′(K′)
RO(X):
Return T (X)
T (X):
If T [X] 6= ⊥ Return T [X]
If T ′[X] 6= ⊥ Then
bad← true; Return T ′[X]
T [X]←$ Rng
Return T [X]
T ′(X):
If T [X] 6= ⊥ Then
bad← true; Return T [X]
If T ′[X] 6= ⊥ Return T ′[X]
T ′[X]←$ Rng
Return T ′[X]
Game4 and Game5:
K←$ Dom(1λ)
b′←$ ARKFn,RO(1λ)
Return (b′ = 1)
RKFn(φ):
K′ ← φT (K)
Return T ′(K′)
RO(X):
Return T (X)
T (X):
If T [X] 6= ⊥ Return T [X]
If T ′[X] 6= ⊥ Then
bad← true
T [X]←$ Rng
Return T [X]
T ′(X):
If T [X] 6= ⊥ Then
bad← true
If T ′[X] 6= ⊥ Then
bad← true; Return T ′[X]
T ′[X]←$ Rng
Return T ′[X]
Fig. 4: Sequence of games for the proof of Theorem 1.
Game3 : ignores the code after bad, i.e., T and T ′ only check consistency using their respective lists.
Let E be the event that bad is set. Event E can happen in one of the following ways. Event E1:
the adversary queries its RO oracle on a point which coincides with the output of an oracle RKD
function. Event E2: an RKD function queries its RO oracle on a point which coincides with the output
of an oracle RKD function. These events will be bounded by the output-unpredictability and query-
independence advantages in the final game. Note that Game3 is identical to the RKA security game
conditioned on b = 0 (i.e., when the RKFn oracle uses an independent random oracle ρ):
AdvrkaDom,Rng,A,Φ(λ) = Pr[S1]− Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[E] ≤ Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] .
Game4 : sets flag bad if procedure T ′ is queried on a point which exists on list T ′. No action is taken.
Game4 and Game3 are identical.
Game5 : ignores the code after the new flag bad, i.e., T ′ no longer checks consistency with any of
the lists. Game5 and Game4 are identical until the adversary queries the RKFn query on two RKD
functions which result in the same output. We denote this by F ′. Let E′1 and E′2 denote the equivalent
of events E1 and E2 in Game5. We have:
Pr[E1]− Pr[E′1] ≤ Pr[F ′] and Pr[E2]− Pr[E′2] ≤ Pr[F ′] .
And hence
AdvrkaDom,Rng,A,Φ(λ) ≤ Pr[E′1] + Pr[E′2] + 2 · Pr[F ′] .
Bounding of the probabilities in the right-hand side of the above inequality in Game5 are straightfor-
ward:
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Event E′1 : Based onA we build adversary B1 against output unpredictability of Φ as follows. Algorithm
B1 runs A and answers its oracle queries (according to game Game5) by simply returning new random
values. When A terminates B1 outputs the list of explicit queries to H by A as List1 and the list of
RKFn queries as List2. We have
Pr[E′1] ≤ AdvupΦ,B1(λ) .
Event E′2 : Based on A we build adversary B2 against query independence of Φ as follows. Algorithm
B2 runs A and answers its oracle queries (according to game Game5) by returning new random values.
When A terminates B2 outputs the queries made to RKFn queries as List. We have
Pr[E′2] ≤ AdvqiΦ,B2(λ) .
Event F ′ : Based on A we build adversary B3 against claw-freeness of Φ as follows. Algorithm B3 runs
A and answers its oracle queries (according to game Game5) by returning new random values. When
A terminates B3 outputs the queries made to RKFn queries as List. We have
Pr[F ′] ≤ AdvcfΦ,B3(λ) .
The theorem follows form the last four inequalities. uunionsq
C The RKA-Secure PRG Transform in the ROM
Theorem 5 (ROM transform). Let PRP := (E,E−1) be a CCA-secure PRP. Let Φ be a family of
oracle RKD sets, and suppose PRGH is a Φ-RKA-secure PRG in the random-oracle model. Suppose the
range of PRGH and the key space of PRP are identical. Define transformed scheme PRPH by
E
H
(K,M) := E(PRGH(K),M) and E−1
H
(K,M) := E−1(PRGH(K),M) .
Then for any Φ-RKCCA adversary A against PRPH in the random-oracle model there is a Φ-RKA
adversary B1 against PRGH in the random-oracle model, an adversary B3 against the claw-freeness of
Φ, and a CCA adversary B2 against PRP such that
Advrkcca
PRP,A,Φ(λ) ≤ AdvrkaPRG,B1,Φ(λ) +AdvcfB2,Φ(λ) +Q(λ) ·AdvccaPRP,B3(λ) +
Q(λ)2
|KSpλ|
where Q(λ) denotes the number related-key oracle queries that A places to its oracles in either the
forward or backward direction.
Proof (Sketch). The proof follows that for the PRG transform of Bellare and Cash [3, Theorem 6.1].
Let Game0 denote the Φ-RKCCA game conditioned on b = 0, i.e., when the PRP and PRGH are used to
answer oracle queries. In Game1 we use a random function R instead of PRGH to preprocess the PRP
key. Any change in adversarial advantage can be upper-bounded using the RKA security of PRG. In
Game2, instead of PRP, we use a random permutation H in oracle queries. Any change of adversarial
success probability in this transition, can be bounded, via a hybrid argument, using the CCA security
of the PRP, provided all the keys output by the queried RKD functions are distinct, an event whose
probably is overwhelming down to claw-freeness. Finally in Game3, we use a random permutation, and
do not use R. The last two games are identical unless distinct keys are mapped to the same point by
R. By the birthday bound, the probability of this event is at most Q(λ)2/|KSpλ|. uunionsq
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D RKA Switching Lemma
In this section we provide a strengthening of the classical PRF/PRP switching lemma to the RKA
setting. The switching lemma we will use in the paper establishes an upper-bound on the distinguishing
capability of an RKA adversary when it is interacting with either the ideal keyed permutation or a
forgetful random oracle that returns random values on each query.
Lemma 1 (RKA switching lemma). Let Φ be a family of RKD sets. Define the advantage of a
ppt adversary A in game RF/RPA,Φ(1λ) shown in Figure 5 by
Adv
rf/rp
A,Φ (λ) := 2 · Pr
[
RF/RPA,Φ(1
λ)
]
− 1 ,
where A is assumed to be non-repeating: it never repeats a query to either of its oracles and whenever
it queries (φ, x) to RKFn (resp., RKFn−1) and receives y, it does not subsequently query (φ, y) to
RKFn−1 (resp., RKFn). Then there exist ppt adversaries B1 and B2 such that
Adv
rf/rp
A,Φ (λ) ≤ AdvcfB1,Φ(λ) +AdvcfB2,Φ(λ) +
Q(λ)2
2|Domλ| ,
where Q(λ) is the number of queries (in either the forward or backward direction) that A places to its
oracles.
RF/RPA,Φ(1
λ):
b←$ {0, 1}
pi←$ Perm(KSpλ,Domλ)
K1, . . . ,Kn←$ KSp(1λ)
b′←$ ARKFn,RKFn−1(1λ)
Return (b′ = b)
RKFn(φ, x):
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
K′ ← φ(K1, . . . ,Kn)
If b = 0 Return Y
Return pi(K′, x)
RKFn−1(φ, x):
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
K′ ← φ(K1, . . . ,Kn)
If b = 0 Return Y
Return pi−1(K′, x)
Fig. 5: An adversary is legitimate if it queries RKFn with a φ ∈ Φλ only.
Proof (Sketch). The main difference with the standard RF/RP switching lemma [40] is that here we
are only guaranteed that the implicit inputs to the oracles are distinct (and not the actual key/point
pairs computed using the queried RKD functions). To deal with this, we use a sequence of games.
We let Game0 denote the game above conditioned on b = 0. We define Game1 by setting a bad
flag bad1 when two distinct queries (φ1, x1) 6= (φ2, x2) are made to either of the oracles such that
(K ′1, x1) = (K ′2, x2). Furthermore, if the bad
1 flag is set, the adversary’s guess is taken to be a purely
random bit, so that it can have no advantage in winning the game. Note that the two games are
identical until bad, and the adversary receives independently generated random values from the two
oracles. The probability that the bad flag is set in Game1 can therefore be reduced to the claw-freeness
property by an adversary B1 that succeeds in breaking it whenever this event occurs.
We now let Game2 denote Game1, but we introduce a new bad flag bad2 that is activated whenever
on a query (φ, x) the oracle is about to return a value that collides with a previous query (φ, x′) with
x 6= x′. Furthermore, if the bad2 flag is set, the adversary’s guess is taken to be a purely random bit,
so that it can have no advantage in winning the game.
Transition from Game1 to Game2 is analyzed by observing that the two games are identical, unless
the adversary causes a collision in the output of the oracle that might occur in Game1, but which causes
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bad2 to be set in Game2. Suppose the adversary splits its q queries into r different RKD functions
φ1, . . . , φr, and denote by q1, . . . , qr the number of queries dedicated to each φi (with the obvious
restriction that q1 + . . .+ qr = q). Then, the probability of this event occurring can be upper-bounded
using the union bound by
r∑
i=1
q2i
2|Domλ| ≤
q2
2|Domλ| .
Finally, we let Game3 be the game above conditioned on b = 1. We observe that the operation of bad2
flag in Game2 ensures that the adversary can only have a distinguishing advantage when interacting
with a ideal keyed permutation. This means that Game3 can be re-written as a game that is identical
to Game2, until the bad1 flag is activated.
Luckily, the probability that the bad1 flag is set in Game2 can be reduced to the claw-freeness
property by an adversary B2 that succeeds in breaking it whenever this event occurs. Combining the
previous results gives us an upper-bound on the adversary’s distinguishing advantage between games
Game0 and Game3, and the theorem follows. uunionsq
E Security Analysis of Fρ[1, 2, 2]
Proof. We prove the theorem via a sequence of five games. Without loss of generality we assume that all
of the adversary’s queries to the RKFn oracle are distinct. Each game’s main and RKFn0 procedures
are shown in Figure 6. We also assume that all lists used in the games are initialized to empty, and
all bad flags are initialized to false. In each game we modify the RKFn1 procedure. We denote the
event that Gamei returns true by Si, and let Bad
j
i denote the event that flag bad
j is set to true in game
Gamei.
Gamei
pi←$ Perm(KSp2λ,Dom2λ)
ρ←$ Func(KSpλ,Domλ,Domλ)
K1,K2←$ KSp(1λ)
b′←$ ARKFnb(1λ)
Return (b′ = b)
RKFn0(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
C ← pi((K′1,K′2),M)
Return C
Fig. 6: Procedures common to Game0–Game5 used in the proof of Theorem 3.
Game0 is the Φ-RKCPA game. We change Game0 to Game1 by implementing the ideal keyed function
via lazy sampling using a list List managed by a new procedure RO(·, ·). The view of the adversary in
the two games is identical:
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] .
From Game1 to Game2 we separate the list used to manage the ideal keyed function into two lists
List1 (for round 1 queries) and List2 (for round 2 and 3 queries). Two procedures RO1(·, ·) and RO2(·, ·)
are now used to manage the two lists independently. We also introduce a flag bad2 that is activated
whenever an inconsistency in the simulation of RO occurs in which case random values are returned to
the adversary in the output of the RKFn1 oracle. We detect such inconsistencies using a third list Listφ
which keeps track of all keys used within the game, and ensures that RO1 and RO2 are always queried
on distinct keys, i.e., these procedures are never called on a common key. This check is sufficient to
ensure consistency of simulation. Game2 is identical to Game1 until Bad22:
Pr[S1]− Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[Bad22] .
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Game0
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′2)
C ← Fρ[K′](M)
Return C
Game1
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′2)
C ← FRO[K′](M)
Return C
RO(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
List← (K,X, Y ) : List
Return Y
Game2
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← FRO1,RO2,RO2 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
ROi(K,X): / i = 1, 2
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ Listi Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
Listi ← (K,X, Y ) : Listi
Return Y
Fig. 7: Game0–Game2 used in the proof of Theorem 3.
The analysis of the probability of setting the bad2 flag is deferred until Game5, where one can show an
upper-bound using the switch-free property of the RKD function family.
In Game3 we prepare the ground for a case analysis that will be carried out in Game4 by excluding
the possibility that the adversary explores claws in the RKD function family. On every query to the
RKFn1 oracle, we check whether the adversary found a claw in the RKD function family. If so, we
set a new bad3 flag and return random values to the adversary. If not, we proceed as in Game2. The
analysis of the probability of setting the bad3 flag is deferred until Game5, where one can establish an
upper-bound using the claw-free property of the RKD function family. Game3 is identical to Game2
until Bad33 occurs. Hence,
Pr[S2]− Pr[S3] ≤ Pr[Bad33] and Pr[Bad22]− Pr[Bad23] ≤ Pr[Bad33] .
In Game4 we modify rounds 2 and 3, i.e., procedure RO2, so that the ideal keyed function in these
rounds is now computed in a forgetful way. This means that fresh outputs are chosen for every query.
A new bad4 flag is associated to the event that an inconsistency with Game3 could occur, i.e., a repeat
query is placed on the round function. Game4 is identical to Game3 until Bad44 occurs. Hence,
Pr[S3]− Pr[S4] ≤ Pr[Bad44] ,
Pr[Bad23]− Pr[Bad24] ≤ Pr[Bad44] ,
Pr[Bad33]− Pr[Bad34] ≤ Pr[Bad44] .
Combining the inequalities we have obtained so far, we get that
Pr[S0]− Pr[S4] ≤ Pr[Bad24] + 2 · Pr[Bad34] + 4 · Pr[Bad44] .
The bulk of the proof consists of an information-theoretic argument that permits upper-bounding the
probability of Bad44. This is proved in Lemma 5.
Finally, Game5 is a very simple game in which all of the adversary’s queries to the RKFn1 oracle
are answered using fresh and independent random values. The view of the adversary in this game is
identical to its view in Game4. To see this, observe that, in Game4 rounds 2 and 3 of the Feistel network
in the RKFn1 oracle are outputting fresh independent random values on every new query due to the
action of RO2. As a result
Pr[S4] = Pr[S5], Pr[Bad
2
4] = Pr[Bad
2
5] and Pr[Bad
3
4] = Pr[Bad
3
5] .
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Game3
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad3 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← FRO1,RO2,RO2 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
ROi(K,X): / i = 1, 2
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ Listi Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
Listi ← (K,X, Y ) : Listi
Return Y
Game4
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad3 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← FRO1,RO2,RO2 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RO1(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List1 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
List1 ← (K,X, Y ) : List1
Return Y
RO2(K,X):
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K,X, ?) ∈ List2 Then bad4 ← true
Else List2 ← (K,X, Y ) : List2
Return Y
Game5
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad3 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
Fig. 8: Game3 and Game4 used in the proof of Theorem 3 and Game5.
In Lemmas 2 and 3 we upper-bound the probabilities of Bad25 and Bad
3
5.
Finally, by construction, the adversary’s probability of success in Game5 is exactly that established
in Lemma 1. So we have,
2 · Pr[S5]− 1 = Advrf/rpA,Φ (λ) .
The theorem follows from combining the above results and using the upper-bounds that we establish
in the lemmas below.
AdvrkcpaFρ[1,2,2],A,Φ(λ) = 2 · Pr[S0]− 1 ≤ Adv
rf/rp
A,Φ (λ) + 2 · Pr[Bad25] + 4 · Pr[Bad35] + 8 · Pr[Bad44] .
uunionsq
Lemma 2. For any Game5 adversary A, there exists an adversary B1 against the switch-free property
of Φ such that
Pr[Bad25] ≤ AdvsfB1,Φ(λ) .
Proof. We build adversary B1 against the switch-free property of Φ as follows. Adversary B1 runs
adversary A in the Game4 environment, always returning random outputs on queries to RKFn1.
When A terminates, B1 returns the list of RKD functions queried to the RKFn1 oracle by A. If event
Bad25 occurred, then the list of functions will satisfy the winning condition in the switch-free game. To
see this, note that the bad2 flag is set if and only if a key K ′1 occurred that collided with a previous
value of K ′2 or a key K ′2 occurred that collided with a previous value of K ′1. Then, if Bad
2
5 occurred, it
must be the case that in the list of φ’s queried by A to the RKFn1 oracle, there exist φ and φ′ such
that φ(K1,K2)|1 = φ′(K1,K2)|2. uunionsq
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Lemma 3. For any Game5 adversary A, there exists an adversary B2 against the claw-free property
of Φ such that
Pr[Bad35] ≤ AdvcfB2,Φ(λ) .
Proof. We build an adversary B2 against the claw-free property of Φ as follows. Adversary B runs
adversary A in the Game5 environment, returning always random outputs on queries to RKFn1.
When A terminates, B2 returns the list of functions queried to the RKFn1 oracle by A. If event Bad35
occurred, then the list of functions will satisfy the winning condition in the claw-free game. To see
this, note that the bad3 flag is set if and only if an entry was added to Listφ such that φ was different
from a previous φ′ and yet the value of (K ′1,K ′2) was the same. uunionsq
The following preliminary lemma is critical to upper-bounding the probability of Bad44.
Lemma 4. Throughout the execution of Game4 the values of Y stored in List1, i.e., the third component
of the entries of List1, are mutually independent and uniformly distributed. Furthermore, these values
are independent from the view of the adversary, which comprises its random coins and the answers it
receives from the queries to the RKFn1 procedure.
Proof. The proof is based on the alternative view of the RKFn1 procedure shown in Figure 9. Through-
out the proof of this lemma (and subsequent lemmas where we refer to this figure) we will denote the
variables manipulated by this procedure when computing the answer to the adversary’s i-th query by
adding the query index to the superscript: (φi,M i) is adversary’s i-th query.
The first query placed by the adversary is fully determined by its random coins. The Y 11 value
is sampled uniformly at random and added to List1. However, R13 is the only variable that depends
on Y 11 and A observes. But since Y 11 is masked by a uniformly and independently chosen value Y 13
(which is never reused in the remainder of the game) in the computation of R13 it remains information-
theoretically hidden from the adversary.
Let us now move to the second query. Conditioning on the view of the adversary in the first query,
the second query is fully determined by the random coins of the adversary and the answers provided
by the previous query. Once again Y 21 is masked by a uniform and independently chosen value Y 23 , and
hence Y 21 remains hidden from the adversary’s view.
This inductive argument establishes the independence claim in the lemma, and as a side result,
we also obtain that the answers provided to the adversary by the RKFn1 oracle are uniformly and
independently distributed. uunionsq
Lemma 5. For all Game4 adversaries making at most Q(λ) oracle queries, we have
Pr[Bad44] ≤
5
2
· Q(λ)
2
|Domλ| .
Proof. In the following description we refer to Figure 9. We will consider the probability of bad4 being
activated in query i, due to a collision with a value stored in List2 in a previous query j < i. We
simplify the analysis by defining three events:
F1 : bad4 is activated in the third round.
F2 : bad4 is activated in the second round due to a collision with a value of the form (K ′
j
2, R
j
2) coming
from the third round of the computation in query j.
F3 : bad4 is activated immediately after the generation of Y i2 due to a collision with a value of the
form (K ′j2, R
j
1) coming from the second round of the computation in query j.
23
RKFn1(φ, (L,R)):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad3 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
L1 ← R // Round 1
If (K′1, R, Y1) ∈ List1 Then R1 ← L⊕ Y1
Else
Y1←$ Dom(1λ)
List1 ← (K′1, R, Y1) : List1
R1 ← L⊕ Y1
L2 ← R1 / Round 2
Y2←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K′2, R1, ?) ∈ List2 Then bad4 ← true
Else List2 ← (K′2, R1, Y2) : List2
R2 ← L1 ⊕ Y2
L3 ← R2 / Round 3
Y3←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K′2, R2, ?) ∈ List2 Then bad4 ← true
Else List2 ← (K′2, R2, Y3) : List2
R3 ← L2 ⊕ Y3
C ← (L3, R3); Return C
Fig. 9: Expanded view of the RKFn1 oracle in Game4.
By the union bound,
Pr[Bad44] ≤ Pr[F1] + Pr[F2] + Pr[F3] .
We first bound the probability of F1. Observe that at each query i the value of Ri2 is uniformly
distributed and independent from all of the previous Rj1 and R
j
2 values stored in List2 for j < i (because
Ri2 are xor-ed with random values Y i2 ). Furthermore, each query adds at most two entries to List2,
which means that a conflict between queries i and j can occur with probability at most 2/|Domλ|.
Therefore, by the union bound, we obtain that
Pr[F1] ≤
Q(λ)∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
2
|Domλ| ≤
Q(λ)2
|Domλ| .
Next we establish a bound on the probability of F2. For this to happen we would need to have
Rj2 = R
i
1 = L
i ⊕ Y i1 , where Rj2 and Li can be fixed, while Y i1 is independently distributed as proven in
Lemma 4. So, the probability of this event occurring is at most 1/|Domλ|. Thus, over all Q(λ) queries
we have
Pr[F2] ≤
Q(λ)∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
1
|Domλ| ≤
Q(λ)2
2|Domλ| .
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To analyze the probability of event F3, we will consider several cases and use the assumption that
all of the adversary’s queries are distinct. We also observe that, under the rules of Game4, due to the
action of the bad2 flag, the RKFn1 procedure is not called when two queried functions φ 6= φ′ yield
the same value (K ′1,K ′2). The case analysis is as follows.
1. Case φi 6= φj .
We have that (K ′1
i,K ′2
i) 6= (K ′1j ,K ′2j). We consider two sub-cases.
(a) Case K ′2
i 6= K ′2j .
By definition, F3 cannot happen since K ′2 is used to check for repetitions.
(b) Case K ′2
i = K ′2
j .
We must have that K ′1
i 6= K ′1j . In this case, event F3 will occur due to a collision with (K ′2j , Rj1)
if and only if Li ⊕ Lj = Y i1 ⊕ Y j1 . However, we know Y i1 and Y j1 were sampled independently
from each other (since K ′1
i 6= K ′1j) and are independently distributed from the adversary’s view
by Lemma 4. This means that the probability of this happening is upper-bounded by 1/|Domλ|.
2. Case φi = φj .
In this it must be the case that (Li, Ri) 6= (Lj , Rj). Again we consider two sub-cases.
(a) Case Ri = Rj .
We must have Li 6= Lj and, by construction, it follows that Rj1 6= Ri1 and therefore event F3
cannot occur due to a collision with (K ′2
j , Rj1).
(b) Case Ri 6= Rj .
In this case, event F3 will occur due to a collision with (K ′2
j , Rj1) if and only if L
i⊕Lj = Y i1⊕Y j1 .
However, we know Y i1 and Y
j
1 were sampled independently from each other (since R
i 6= Rj)
and are information-theoretically hidden from the adversary according to Lemma 4. This means
that the probability of this happening is upper-bounded by 1/|Domλ|.
Putting together the results of our case analysis, and using the union bound over all query combi-
nations, we get that
Pr[F3] ≤
Q(λ)∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
2
|Domλ| ≤
Q(λ)2
|Domλ| .
The lemma follows from the combination of the above results. uunionsq
F Security Analysis of Fρ[1, 2, 3]
In this section we answer the natural question of what level of RKA security does the original Fρ[1, 2, 3]
construction achieve. Recall that the Bellare–Kohno attack [5] ruled out Φ⊕3 -RKCPA, as it is possible
to use xor-ing to tamper with the key in the last round. We therefore define a family of RKD sets
Φ?3 ⊂ Φ⊕3 , which we prove to be both sufficient and necessary for the RKCPA security of the Fρ[1, 2, 3]
construction. This family includes all functions of the form
φ : (K1,K2,K3) 7→ (K1 ⊕ C1,K2 ⊕ C3,K3 ⊕ C3)
such that, for any two (C1, C2, C3), (C ′1, C ′2, C ′3) ∈ Φ?3, whenever C3 6= C ′3, then (C1, C2) 6= (C ′1, C ′2).
Necessity follows from the observation that any two RKD functions which fail to satisfy this property
can be used to launch a BK-type attack. We next prove sufficiency.
Proposition 2. The Fρ[1, 2, 3] construction is a Φ?3-RKCPA-secure PRP. More precisely, for any ppt
adversary A we have that
AdvrkcpaFρ[1,2,3],A,Φ?3(λ) ≤ Adv
rf/rp
A,Φ?3(λ) +
26 ·Q(λ)2
|Domλ| ,
where Q(λ) is the maximum number of queries that A to its oracle.
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Proof (Sketch). The proof of this proposition uses a sequence of games similar to those in the proof of
Theorem 3. The main difference lies in the fact that the restrictions imposed on the RKD set enforce
exactly the same restrictions that we derived from the claw-free and switch-free conditions. As we have
seen, the xor-based RKD sets are intrinsically switch-free. For the claw-freeness property, however,
we need extra restrictions to be imposed. Observe that in the Fρ[1, 2, 2] case, the absence of claws
guaranteed that different RKD functions imply that either the first round key or the other key is
modified. For the case analysis in the proof of Theorem 3 it is critical that one can argue that either
the key for the first round changed, or the key for the second round changed. To obtain a similar
implication in the Fρ[1, 2, 3] case we impose the C3 6= C ′3 ⇒ (C1, C2) 6= (C ′1, C ′2) restriction. The
proposition then follows from the same information-theoretic arguments that conclude the proof of
Theorem 3 together with an application of Lemma 1. uunionsq
G Security Analysis of Fρ[1, 2, 1, 2]
We prove the theorem via a sequence of seven games. Without loss of generality we assume that all of
the adversary’s queries to the RKFn and RKFn−1 oracle are distinct. The adversary will also refrain
from inverting a value that it obtained from an forward oracle query or computing in the forward
direction a value it has already received from the inversion oracle. Each game’s main and RKFn0
and RKFn−10 procedures are shown in Figure 10. We also assume that all lists used in the games are
initialized to empty, and all bad flags are initialized to false. In each game we modify the RKFn1 and
RKFn−11 procedures. We denote the event that Gamei returns true by Si and let Bad
j
i denote the event
that flag badj is set to true in game Gamei.
Gamei
pi←$ Perm(KSp2λ,Dom2λ)
ρ←$ Func(KSpλ,Domλ,Domλ)
K1,K2←$ KSp(1λ)
b′←$ ARKFnb,RKFn−1b (1λ)
Return (b′ = b)
RKFn0(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
C ← pi((K′1,K′2),M)
Return C
RKFn−10 (φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
C ← pi−1((K′1,K′2),M)
Return C
Fig. 10: Procedures common to Game0–Game7 used in the proof of Theorem 4.
We will first intuitively explain the modifications introduced in each game. Then we will present
a series of lemmas that establish intermediate results that we require for our proof. The proof of the
theorem will be presented last.
Game0 is the original security game in the ideal keyed function model. Our goal is to prove that the
adversary’s distinguishing probability in this game is negligible.
Game7 is the terminal game. All of the adversary’s queries to the construction are answered using
values sampled independently and uniformly at random. The adversary’s probability of success in
this game is exactly that established in Lemma 1, and therefore negligible.
Game1 introduces the conceptual change of implementing the ideal keyed function in the rounds of the
Feistel construction using lazy sampling. An initially empty list is maintained by a new procedure
RO(·, ·). Whenever the function should be evaluated, the list is checked for a repeat input to ensure
consistent answers. If a fresh input is given, then the output sampled independently and uniformly
at random and added to the list. The view of the adversary is identical in Game0 and Game1.
Game2 separates the list used to manage the ideal keyed function into two different ones: List13
(corresponding to rounds 1 and 3) and List24 (corresponding to rounds and 2 and 4). Two procedures
RO13(·, ·) and RO24(·, ·) are used to manage the two lists independently. We also introduce a bad2
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flag that is activated whenever an inconsistency in the simulation of the ideal keyed function occurs.
Furthermore, once this flag is activated, random values are returned to the adversary in the output
of the construction in both forward and backward directions. The analysis of the probability of
setting the bad2 flag is deferred until Game7, where one can show an upper-bound using the switch-
free property of the RKD function family. Game2 is identical to Game1 until Bad22 occurs.
Game3 introduces another conceptual change. It further divides List13 and List24. There are now four
lists List1, List2, List3 and List4 and four respective procedures RO1, RO2, RO3 and RO4 for each
round. However, at this point the game still keeps track of possible collisions between List1 and
List3 and between List2 and List4. Therefore, the view of the adversary is identical in Game2 and
Game3.
Game4 modifies the round 1 oracle in forward computations to make sure that it only uses values
stored in List1. Similarly, it modifies round 4 in inverse computations to make sure that it only uses
values stored in List4. This means that we now need to maintain six different procedures to manage
lists List1 to List4. Intuitively, this is needed to ensure that later in Game6 the values in List1 and
List4 are information-theoretically hidden from the adversary. A new bad4 flag is associated to the
event that an inconsistency with Game3 could occur. Game4 is identical to Game3 until Bad44 occurs.
The analysis of the probability of bad4 being activated is deferred until Game6.
Game5 prepares the ground for a case analysis that will be carried out in Game6 by excluding the
possibility that the adversary explores claws in the RKD function family. On every query to the
RKFn1 and RKFn−11 oracles, it checks whether the adversary found a claw in the RKD function
family. If so, it sets a new bad5 flag and returns a random value to the adversary. If not, it proceeds
as in Game4. The analysis of the probability of setting the bad5 flag is deferred until Game7, where
one can easily show an upper-bound using the claw-freeness of the RKD set. Game5 is identical to
Game4 until Bad55.
Game6 modifies rounds 2–4 in forward computations and rounds 1–3 in backward computations so
that the ideal keyed function in these rounds is now computed in a forgetful way. This means
that fresh outputs are chosen for every query. A new bad6 flag is associated to the event that an
inconsistency with Game5 occurs, so that the two games are identical until Bad66. The bulk of the
proof consists of an argument that permits upper-bounding the probabilities of Bad64 or Bad
6
5. The
fact that the adversary obtains independent and uniformly distributed random values in all oracle
answers computed in Game7 implies that the adversary’s view is identical in Game6 and Game7.
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Game0
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
C ← Fρ[K′](M)
Return C
RKFn−11 (φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
C ← F−1ρ[K′](M)
Return C
Game1
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
C ← FRO[K′](M)
Return C
RKFn−11 (φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
C ← F−1RO[K′](M)
Return C
RO(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
List← (K,X, Y ) : List
Return Y
Game2
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← FRO13,RO24,RO13,RO24 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RKFn−11 (φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← F−1RO13,RO24,RO13,RO24 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RO13(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List13 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
List13 ← (K,X, Y ) : List13
Return Y
RO24(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List24 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
List24 ← (K,X, Y ) : List24
Return Y
Game3
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← FRO1,RO2,RO3,RO4 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RKFn−11 (φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← F−1RO1,RO2,RO3,RO4 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
ROi(K,X): / i = 1, 3
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List1 ∪ List3 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
Listi ← (K,X, Y ) : Listi
Return Y
ROi(K,X): / i = 2, 4
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List2 ∪ List4 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
Listi ← (K,X, Y ) : Listi
Return Y
Fig. 11: Game0–Game3 used in the proof of Theorem 4.
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Game4
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← FRO11,RO2,RO3,RO4 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RO11(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List1 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K,X, ?) ∈ List3 Then bad4 ← true
Else List1 ← (K,X, Y ) : List1
Return Y
ROi(K,X): / i = 1, 3
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List1 ∪ List3 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
Listi ← (K,X, Y ) : Listi
Return Y
RKFn−11 (φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← F−1RO1,RO2,RO3,RO44 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RO44(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List4 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K,X, ?) ∈ List2 Then bad4 ← true
Else List4 ← (K,X, Y ) : List4
Return Y
ROi(K,X): / i = 2, 4
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List2 ∪ List4 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
Listi ← (K,X, Y ) : Listi
Return Y
Game5
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad5 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← FRO11,RO2,RO3,RO4 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RO11(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List1 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K,X, ?) ∈ List3 Then bad4 ← true
Else List1 ← (K,X, Y ) : List1
Return Y
ROi(K,X): / i = 1, 3
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List1 ∪ List3 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
Listi ← (K,X, Y ) : Listi
Return Y
RKFn−11 (φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad5 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← F−1RO1,RO2,RO3,RO44 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RO44(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List4 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K,X, ?) ∈ List2 Then bad4 ← true
Else List4 ← (K,X, Y ) : List4
Return Y
ROi(K,X): / i = 2, 4
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List2 ∪ List4 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
Listi ← (K,X, Y ) : Listi
Return Y
Fig. 12: Game4 and Game5 used in the proof of Theorem 4.
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Game6
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad5 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← FRO11,RO2,RO3,RO4 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RO11(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List1 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K,X, ?) ∈ List3 Then bad4 ← true
Else List1 ← (K,X, Y ) : List1
Return Y
ROi(K,X): / i = 1, 3
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List1 ∪ List3 Then bad6 ← true
Else Listi ← (K,X, Y ) : Listi
Return Y
RKFn−11 (φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad5 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Else
C ← F−1RO1,RO2,RO3,RO44 [K′](M)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RO44(K,X):
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List4 Return Y
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K,X, ?) ∈ List2 Then bad4 ← true
Else List4 ← (K,X, Y ) : List4
Return Y
ROi(K,X): / i = 2, 4
Y ←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K,X, Y ) ∈ List2 ∪ List4 Then bad6 ← true
Else Listi ← (K,X, Y ) : Listi
Return Y
Game7
RKFn1(φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad5 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
RKFn−11 (φ,M):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
K′ ← (K′1,K′2,K′1,K′2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad5 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
Fig. 13: Game6 and Game7 used in the proof of Theorem 4.
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We start by proving two lemmas in the environment of Game7.
Lemma 6. For any Game7 adversary A, there exists an adversary B1 against the switch-free property
of Φ such that
Pr[Bad27] ≤ AdvsfB1,Φ(λ) .
Proof. We build adversary B1 against the switch-free property of Φ as follows. Adversary B1 runs
adversary A in the Game7 environment, returning always random outputs on queries to RKFn1 or
RKFn−11 . When A terminates, B1 returns the list of RKD functions queried to the RKFn1 or RKFn−11
oracles by A. If event Bad27 occurred, then the list of functions will satisfy the winning condition in
the switch-free game. To see this, note that the bad2 flag is set if and only if a key K ′1 occurred that
collided with a previous value of K ′2 or a key K ′2 occurred that collided with a previous value of K ′1.
Then, if Bad27 occurred, it must be the case that in the list of φ’s queried by A to the RKFn1 or
RKFn−11 oracles, there exist φ and φ
′ such that φ(K1,K2)|1 = φ′(K1,K2)|2. uunionsq
Lemma 7. For any Game7 adversary A, there exists an adversary B2 against the claw-free property
of Φ such that
Pr[Bad57] ≤ AdvcfB2,Φ(λ) .
Proof. We build an adversary B2 against the claw-free property of Φ. Adversary B2 runs adversary
A in the Game7 environment, returning always random outputs on queries to RKFn1 or RKFn−11 .
When A terminates, B2 returns the list of functions queried to the RKFn1 or RKFn−11 oracles by A.
If event Bad57 occurred, then the list of functions will satisfy the winning condition in the claw-free
game. To see this, note that the bad5 flag is set if and only if an entry was added to Listφ such that φ
was different from a previous φ′ and yet the value of (K ′1,K ′2) was the same. uunionsq
The next lemma is central to the analysis of the bad events in Game6.
Lemma 8. Throughout the execution of Game6 the values of Y stored in List1 and List4, i.e., the
third component of the entries of List1 and List4, are uniformly and mutually independently distributed.
Furthermore, they are independent from the view of the adversary, which comprises its random coins
and the answers it receives from the queries to the RKFn1 and RKFn−11 oracles.
Proof. The proof is based on the alternative view of the RKFn1 and RKFn−11 oracles shown in
Figure 14.
Throughout the proof we will refer to the variables manipulated by these oracles when computing
the answer to the adversary’s i-th query by adding the query index as a superscript, referring to the
i-th query by (φi,M i).
The first query placed by the adversary is fully determined by its random coins. Suppose this is
a RKFn1 query. The Y 11 value is sampled uniformly at random and added to List1. However, we can
see that the value of Y 11 is information-theoretically hidden from the adversary as it is masked by Y 13 ,
which is sampled in this query and never reused in the remainder of the game. Similarly, the value of
Y 14 is also sampled uniformly at random, added to List4 and is masked by the value of Y 12 .
Suppose now the first query was to RKFn−11 . The Y
1
4 value is sampled uniformly at random and
added to List4. However, we can see that the value of L11 is information-theoretically hidden from the
adversary by the value of Y 12 , which is sampled in this query and never reused in the remainder of the
game. Similarly, the value of Y 11 is also sampled uniformly at random, added to List1 and masked by
the value of Y 13 .
Let us now move to the second query. Conditioning on the view of the adversary in the first query,
the second query is fully determined by the random coins of the adversary and the answers provided
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RKFn1(φ, (L,R)):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad5 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
L1 ← R // Round 1
If (K′1, R, Y1) ∈ List1 Then R1 ← L⊕ Y1
Else
Y1←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K′1, R, ?) ∈ List3 Then bad4 ← true
Else List1 ← (K′1, R, Y1) : List1
R1 ← L⊕ Y1
L2 ← R1 / Round 2
Y2←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K′2, R1, ?) ∈ List2 ∪ List4 Then bad6 ← true
Else List2 ← (K′2, R1, Y2) : List2
R2 ← L1 ⊕ Y2
L3 ← R2 / Round 3
Y3←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K′1, R2, ?) ∈ List1 ∪ List3 Then bad6 ← true
Else List3 ← (K′1, R2, Y3) : List3
R3 ← L2 ⊕ Y3
L4 ← R3 / Round 4
Y4←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K′2, R3, ?) ∈ List2 ∪ List4 Then bad6 ← true
Else List4 ← (K′2, R3, Y4) : List4
R4 ← L3 ⊕ Y4
C ← (L4, R4); Return C
RKFn−11 (φ, (L4, R4)):
(K′1,K
′
2)← φ(K1,K2)
If (?, ?,K′1) ∈ Listφ ∨ (?,K′2, ?) ∈ Listφ
bad2 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
Else If (φ′,K′1,K′2) ∈ Listφ ∧ φ′ 6= φ
bad5 ← true
C←$ Dom(1λ)× Dom(1λ)
Listφ ← (φ,K′1,K′2) : Listφ
Return C
R3 ← L4 / Round 4
If (K′2, R3, Y4) ∈ List4 Then L3 ← R4 ⊕ Y4
Else
Y4←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K′2, R3, ?) ∈ List2 Then bad4 ← true
Else List4 ← (K′2, R3, Y4) : List4
L3 ← R4 ⊕ Y4
R2 ← L3 / Round 3
Y3←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K′1, R2, ?) ∈ List1 ∪ List3 Then bad6 ← true
Else List3 ← (K′1, R2, Y3) : List3
L2 ← R3 ⊕ Y3
R1 ← L2 / Round 2
Y2←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K′2, R1, ?) ∈ List2 ∪ List4 Then bad6 ← true
Else List2 ← (K′2, R1, Y2) : List2
L1 ← R2 ⊕ Y2
R← L1 / Round 1
Y1←$ Dom(1λ)
If (K′1, R, ?) ∈ List1 ∪ List3 Then bad6 ← true
Else List1 ← (K′1, R, Y1) : List1
L← R1 ⊕ Y1
C ← (L,R); Return C
Fig. 14: Expanded view of the RKFn1 and RKFn−11 oracles in Game6.
by the previous query. Once again Y 21 is masked by a uniform and independently chosen value Y 23 , and
hence Y 21 remains hidden from the adversary’s view. Similarly Y 24 remains hidden from the adversary.
This inductive argument can be applied to all subsequent queries, establishing the independence
claim in the lemma. It also implies that the outputs of the RKFn1 and RKFn−11 provided to the
adversary in this game are all uniformly and independently distributed. uunionsq
The next lemma gives an upper-bound on the probability of the bad4 flag being activated in Game6.
Lemma 9. For any Game6 adversary A placing at most Q(λ) oracle queries in total
Pr[Bad46] ≤
Q(λ)2
2|Domλ| .
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Proof. We will refer again to Figure 14. Take any two queries i and j, with j < i that would cause the
bad4 flag to be set when query i is placed, due to a conflict with a value stored in either List2 or List3
due to query j.
For a conflict to occur in List3 during the computation of RKFn1, we would need to have Ri = R
j
2.
There are two cases:
– If Rj2 resulted from a forward query, then we would need to have R
j
2 = R
j ⊕ Y j2 . This means the
adversary could place a query that would satisfy the following equation: Rj⊕Ri = Y j2 . However, Y j2
occurred only once in the game and was given to the adversary in the form of Y j2 = R
j
4⊕Rj ⊕ Y j4 .
Rewriting the equations, the adversary would need to come up with a query that satisfies the
following equation: Rj ⊕Ri = Rj4 ⊕Rj ⊕ Y j4 . This simplifies to Ri = Rj4 ⊕ Y j4 .
– If Rj2 resulted from a backward query, then the adversary would need to satisfy exactly the same
equation Ri = Rj4 ⊕ Y j4 .
In both of the equations above, all of the terms are fixed in the adversary’s view, except the Y j4
value. However, from Lemma 8, we know that the Y4 values stored in List4 are independent from the
adversary’s view, which means that the probability of this event for queries i and j is at most 1/|Domλ|.
The probability of a conflict occurring in List2 during the computation of RKFn−11 , can be analyzed
in exactly the same way. We conclude that, for any two queries i and j with j < i, the probability
of the bad4 flag being set is upper-bounded by 1/|Domλ| (the flag can only be activated in one of the
oracles in each query). Applying the union bound, we obtain
Pr[Bad46] ≤
Q(λ)∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
1
|Domλ| ≤
Q(λ)2
2|Domλ| .
uunionsq
The next lemma provides a bound on the probability of the bad6 flag being activated in Game6.
Lemma 10. For any Game6 adversary A placing at most Q(λ) oracle queries in total
Pr[Bad66] ≤
5Q(λ)2
|Domλ| .
Proof. We will refer again to Figure 14. Take any two queries i and j with j < i that would cause the
bad6 flag to be set when query i is placed due to a conflict with a value stored in one of the lists in
the game during the execution of query j. We split the analysis by defining various sub-events:
F1 : bad6 is activated in the third and fourth rounds of the RKFn1 oracle, or in the first and second
rounds of the RKFn−11 oracle, i.e., the output rounds in both oracles.
F2 : bad6 is activated in the second round of the RKFn1 oracle due to a collision with a value of the
form (K ′j2, R
j
3) stored in List4.
F3 : bad6 is activated in the third round RKFn−11 oracle due to a collision with a value of the form
(K ′j1, R
j) stored in List1.
F4 : bad6 is activated in the second round of the RKFn1 oracle due to a collision with a value of the
form (K ′j2, R
j
1) stored in List2.
F5 : bad6 is activated in the third round of the RKFn−11 oracle due to a collision with a value of the
form (K ′j1, R
j
2) stored in List3.
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By the union bound
Pr[Bad66] = Pr[F1 ∨ F2 ∨ F3 ∨ F4 ∨ F5] ≤ Pr[F1] + Pr[F2] + Pr[F3] + Pr[F4] + Pr[F5] .
We first bound the probability of F1. There are four places in which the bad6 flag can be activated
to cause this event, and we will upper-bound the probability of each of them occurring in exactly
the same way. Observe that any query j adds at most two values to the composed lists List1 ∪ List3
and List2 ∪ List4. Furthermore, due to the action of Y i2 and Y i3 , the values of Ri2 and Ri3 in RKFn1
are uniformly distributed and independent from all of the previous values stored in List1 ∪ List3 and
List2∪List4 in all queries j < i; similarly, the values of Ri1 and Ri in RKFn−11 are uniformly distributed
and independent from all of the previous values stored in List1 ∪ List3 and List2 ∪ List4 in all queries
j < i. This means that the probability of the bad6 flag being activated due to a conflict between values
added in queries i and j is 2/|Domλ| at each of the four points relevant for F1. By the union bound,
and observing that in query i only one of the oracles will be executed (meaning that the bad6 can only
be activated in two positions), we obtain that
Pr[F1] ≤
Q(λ)∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
2 · 2
|Domλ| ≤
2Q(λ)2
|Domλ| .
We move on to analyze F2. For this event to occur, we would need to have Ri1 = R
j
3 or L
i⊕Y i1 = Rj3,
where Rj3 = L
j
4 and L
i can be fixed, leaving Y i1 independently distributed according to Lemma 8. We
note that due to our labeling of variables in the RKFn−11 procedure, this equation is also valid for
values of Rj3 and L
j
4 in backward queries. So, the probability of this occurring is at most 1/|Domλ|.
Again, over all Q(λ) queries, we have
Pr[F2] ≤
Q(λ)∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
1
|Domλ| ≤
Q(λ)2
2|Domλ| .
The analysis of F3 is analogous and leads to
Pr[F3] ≤ Q(λ)
2
2|Domλ| .
Let us now consider the probability of F4. Recall that this refers to a collision between values of
the form (K ′2
i, Ri1) and (K ′2
j , Rj1) in the second round of the RKFn1 oracle, immediately after the
generation of Y2.
We need to split the analysis into several cases. We observe that the j-th query may have been a
forward or a backward query. However, in the case analysis below this will be irrelevant due to the
assumption that the adversary does not place redundant queries and due to the fact that, in Figure 14,
the labeling of variables is consistent between the two oracles, leading to identical equations in both
case. We consider the following cases:
1. Case φi 6= φj .
Given the operation of initial lines in the RKFn1 oracle, we know that the Feistel construction
will only be computed if (K ′1
i,K ′2
i) 6= (K ′1j ,K ′2j), so we can consider two sub-cases.
(a) Case K ′2
i 6= K ′2j .
In this case, it is clear that, by definition, F4 cannot be caused due to a conflict between queries
i and j.
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(b) Case K ′2
i = K ′2
j .
In this case we must have that K ′1
i 6= K ′1j and event F4 will occur due to a collision with
(K ′2
j , Rj1) if and only if L
i ⊕ Lj = Y i1 ⊕ Y j1 . However, we know Y i1 and Y j1 were sampled inde-
pendently from each other (due to the distinct K ′1 values and Lemma 8) and are information-
theoretically hidden from the adversary (again by Lemma 8). This means that the probability
of this happening is upper-bounded by 1/|Domλ|.
2. Case φi = φj . In this case we surely have K ′2
i = K ′2
j occurring in queries i and j, and it must be
the case that M i = (Li, Ri) 6= (Lj , Rj) = M j . Again we consider two sub-cases.
(a) Case Ri = Rj .
In this case we must have Li 6= Lj (since we know that the adversary does not place redundant
queries) and, by construction, it follows that Rj1 6= Ri1 and therefore event F4 cannot occur due
to a collision with (K ′2
j , Rj1).
(b) Case Ri 6= Rj .
In this case, event F4 will occur due to a collision with (K ′2
j , Rj1) if and only if L
i⊕Lj = Y i1⊕Y j1 .
However, we know Y i1 and Y
j
1 were sampled independently from each other (due to distinct R
values and Lemma 8) and are information-theoretically hidden from the adversary (again by
Lemma 8). This means that the probability of this happening is upper-bounded by 1/|Domλ|.
Putting together the results of our case analysis, and using the union bound over all query combi-
nations, we get that
Pr[F4] ≤
Q(λ)∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
2
|Domλ| ≤
Q(λ)2
|Domλ| .
The analysis for F5 follows an identical structure to that presented for Pr[F4], and we obtain precisely
the same bound:
Pr[F5] ≤ Q(λ)
2
|Domλ| .
The lemma follows from the combination of the above results. uunionsq
We now use the previous results to complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof. We have defined Game0 to be the Φ-RKCCA game and changed Game0 to Game1 by implement-
ing the ideal keyed function via lazy sampling. The two games are identical and therefore
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] .
From Game1 to Game2 we modify the way in which the ideal keyed function is simulated. Rather
than keeping a single consistent list of answered calls, we use two separate lists List13 and List24. We
also add consistency check that may set a bad2 flag when a query is placed by the adversary that
would reveal an inconsistency in the random function simulation. Once this flag is set, the adversary
receives only random values from the RKFn1 and RKFn−11 oracles. However, if the bad
2 flag is not
set, then the two games are identical, and thus
Pr[S1]− Pr[S2] ≤ Pr[Bad22] .
The analysis of the probability of event Bad22 will be deferred until Game7.
In Game3 we introduce another conceptual change in the way we manage the values in List13 and
List24. We separate the values generated by all rounds into four separate lists, but we keep track of the
values in exactly the same way as in Game2. This change does not affect the game in any way, and so
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2] and Pr[Bad22] = Pr[Bad
2
3] .
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Combining the results so far, we have:
Pr[S0]− Pr[S3] ≤ Pr[Bad23] .
In Game4 we make sure that round 1 in forward computations reuses values generated by this round
alone, i.e., values in List1. Similarly, we ensure that round 4 in backward computations reuses values
from this value alone, i.e., values in List4. The bad4 flag signals situations in which this new form of
simulating the round functions could introduce an inconsistency with Game3. For this reason, Game3
and Game4 are identical until bad4:
Pr[S3]− Pr[S4] ≤ Pr[Bad44] ,
Pr[Bad23]− Pr[Bad24] ≤ Pr[Bad44] .
The analysis of the probability of event Bad44 will be deferred until Game6. In any case, we obtain
Pr[S0]− Pr[S4] ≤ Pr[Bad24] + 2 · Pr[Bad44] .
In Game5 we exclude the possibility that the adversary explores claws in the RKD function family.
On every query to the RKFn1 or RKFn−11 oracles we check whether the adversary found a claw in
the RKD function family. If so, we set a new bad5 flag and return random values to the adversary. If
not, we proceed as in Game4. Hence
Pr[S4]− Pr[S5] ≤ Pr[Bad55] ,
Pr[Bad44]− Pr[Bad45] ≤ Pr[Bad55] ,
Pr[Bad24]− Pr[Bad25] ≤ Pr[Bad55] .
The analysis of the probability of setting the bad5 flag is deferred until Game7.
In Game6 we change the simulation of the ideal keyed function once more, returning a fresh random
value to all calls placed by rounds 2, 3 and 4 in forward computations and rounds 1, 2 and 3 in backward
computations. The bad6 flag signals situations in which this new form of simulating the round functions
could introduce an inconsistency with Game5. We have:
Pr[S5]− Pr[S6] ≤ Pr[Bad66] ,
Pr[Bad55]]− Pr[Bad56] ≤ Pr[Bad66] ,
Pr[Bad45]− Pr[Bad46] ≤ Pr[Bad55] ,
Pr[Bad25]− Pr[Bad26] ≤ Pr[Bad66] .
Combining these equations with the results above, we get:
Pr[S0]− Pr[S6] ≤ Pr[Bad26] + 2 · Pr[Bad46] + 4 · Pr[Bad56] + 8 · Pr[Bad66] .
Finally, we observe that in Game6 the keys K1 and K2 are only used in the computation of Y1 and
Y4 values, which by Lemma 8 are information-theoretically hidden from the adversary. Furthermore,
due to the action of rounds 3 and 4 in the RKFn1 oracle and rounds 1 and 2 in the RKFn−11 oracle, the
values returned by each query and uniformly and independently distributed from all previous answers
provided to the adversary. Therefore, in Game7 we make the conceptual change of simplifying Game6
so that random answers are provided to the adversary. For convenience, we preserve the code related
to the bad2 and bad5 flags. Since the view of the adversary in Game7 is identical to that in Game6,
Pr[S6] = Pr[S7], Pr[Bad
2
6] = Pr[Bad
2
7] and Pr[Bad
5
6] = Pr[Bad
5
7] .
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Consequently, we get
Pr[S0]− Pr[S7] ≤ Pr[Bad27] + 2 · Pr[Bad46] + 4 · Pr[Bad57] + 8 · Pr[Bad66] .
The probabilities of Bad27 occurring and Bad
5
7 occurring are upper-bounded in Lemmas 6 and 7, re-
spectively. The probabilities of Bad46 occurring and Bad
6
6 occurring are upper-bounded in Lemmas 9
and 10, respectively.
Finally, in Game7, and recalling that the adversary is assumed not to place redundant queries, we
can see that the adversary is either interacting with the ideal keyed permutation, or with two ideal
keyed functions implemented by oracles RKFn1 and RKFn−11 . This means that, by construction, the
adversary’s probability of success in Game7 is exactly that established in Lemma 1:
2 · Pr[S7]− 1 = Advrf/rpA,Φ (λ) .
The theorem follows by combining the previous results:
2 · Pr[S0]− 1 ≤ Advrf/rpA,Φ (λ) + 2 · Pr[Bad27] + 4 · Pr[Bad46] + 8 · Pr[Bad57] + 16 · Pr[Bad66] .
uunionsq
H Security Analysis of Fρ[1, 2, 3, 4]
Similarly to the CPA setting, we consider the question of which level of RKA security does the 4-round
Luby–Rackoff construction achieve. We establish security with respect to all functions φ ∈ Φ?4 of the
form
φC1,C2,C3,C4 : (K1,K2,K3,K4) 7→ (K1 ⊕ C1,K2 ⊕ C3,K3 ⊕ C3,K4 ⊕ C4)
such that, for any two (C1, C2, C3, C4), (C ′1, C ′2, C ′3, C ′4) ∈ Φ?4, if (C4, C3) 6= (C ′4, C ′3) then (C1, C2) 6=
(C ′1, C ′2), and if (C1, C2) 6= (C ′1, C ′2), then (C3, C4) 6= (C ′3, C ′4). Our result is as follows.
Proposition 3. Let Φ?4 be the RKD set above. Then the F
ρ[1, 2, 3, 4] construction is a Φ?4-RKCCA-
secure PRP. More precisely, for any ppt adversary A we have that
AdvrkccaFρ[1,2,3,4],A,Φ?4(λ) ≤ Adv
rf/rp
A,Φ?4(λ) +
29 ·Q(λ)2
|Domλ| ,
where Q(λ) is the maximum number of queries that A to places to either of its oracles.
Proof (Sketch). The proof of this proposition uses a sequence of games similar to those in the proof of
Theorem 4. Again, the main difference lies in the fact that the restrictions imposed on the RKD-set
enforce exactly the same restrictions that we derived from the claw-free and switch-free conditions.
More precisely, given that the xor-based RKD set is intrinsically switch-free, the extra restriction
imposed on the RKD-set are needed to obtain benefits analogous to the claw-free condition. In this
case, for the case analysis to go through, we must ensure that different RKD functions imply a different
key in at least one of rounds 1 and 2 in RKFn and at least one of rounds 3 and 4 in RKFn−1. This
justifies the (C4, C3) 6= (C ′4, C ′3)⇒ (C1, C2) 6= (C ′1, C ′2) and (C1, C2) 6= (C ′1, C ′2)⇒ (C3, C4) 6= (C ′3, C ′)
restrictions. The proposition then follows from the same information-theoretic arguments that conclude
the proof of Theorem 4 together with an application of Lemma 1. uunionsq
We observe that, unlike the CPA case, we do not know if the restriction on Φ?4 is necessary. Indeed,
it is an interesting open question to find an attack that shows that this is the case or, conversely, to
strengthen the result by imposing a weaker restriction (see the conjecture in Section 8).
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